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INTRODUCTION
In June and July 2013, documents leaked by a government
contractor revealed details of three expansive surveillance programs operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and the Department of Defense on behalf of the National Secu1
rity Agency (NSA). The first requires that Verizon and other
telecommunication companies provide to the NSA on a daily
basis “all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by
Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and
abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local
1. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us
-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret
-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html;
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [hereinafter Greenwald,
Phone Records]; Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet,’ GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013, http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data [hereinafter Greenwald, XKeyscore].
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2

telephone calls.” Although this program does not allow for the
collection of content, including customers’ conversations, telephony metadata is a rich source of information, giving authorities vast knowledge about callers’ identity, location, and
3
social networks. A second program, referred to in leaked documents as “PRISM,” reportedly allows the NSA and the FBI to
access “audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs” collected by nine leading U.S. in4
ternet companies, including Google and Facebook. The third
program, called XKeyscore, provides analysts with the capacity
to mine content and metadata generated by e-mail, chat, and
browsing activities through a global network of servers and in5
ternet access points. These revelations confirm previous reports about a comprehensive domestic surveillance program
that seeks to provide government agents with contemporary
and perpetual access to details about everywhere we go and
everything we do, say, or write, particularly when using or in
6
the company of networked technologies.

2. Verizon Forced to Hand Over Telephone Data‒Full Court Ruling,
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/
jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order [hereinafter FISA]. The NSA subsequently released a declassified version of the order. See Declassified Government Documents Related to NSA Collection of Telephone Metadata Records,
POST,
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/government
WASH.
-documents-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2013).
3. Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Anger Swells After NSA Phone
Records Court Order Revelations, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/obama-administration-nsa-verizon
-records (“[Telephony] metadata . . . can provide authorities with vast
knowledge about a caller’s identity. . . . [C]ross-checked against other public
records, the metadata can reveal someone’s name, address, driver’s license,
credit history, social security number and more.”).
4. Gellman & Poitras, supra note 1. The companies identified as participants in PRISM have denied granting government agents open access to their
servers. Id. As of this writing, the full truth of the program remains hidden
behind a veil of alleged national security necessity.
5. Greenwald, XKeyscore, supra note 1.
6. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY 177–96 (2008) [hereinafter BAMFORD, SHADDOW]; James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s
Biggest Spy Center, WIRED MAG., Mar. 15, 2012, available at http://www.wired
.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1 [hereinafter Bamford, The
NSA is Building]; Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK
(Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/12/12/the-fed
-who-blew-the-whistle.html; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S.
Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes
.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all.
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The domestic surveillance infrastructure is not confined to
our networked communications, however. Consider aerial
drones. No longer just a feature of modern warfare, unmanned
7
aerial drones now populate domestic airspace. Military-style
8
drones operate along the United States border with Mexico.
Farther inland, law enforcement agencies are starting to use a
9
variety of drones during their routine police operations. Many
of these drones are hardly visible, and some are as small as in10
sects. Among the primary advantages of these drone surveil11
lance systems is that they are “covert.” As one operator reported: “You don’t hear it, and unless you know what you’re
12
looking for, you can’t see it.” Drones are also increasingly in13
expensive, with some costing just a few hundred dollars. Given the diversity, power, secrecy, and increasingly modest cost of
aerial drones, we should expect them to become a more and
14
more common presence in our skies.
We are also increasingly subject to surveillance by systems
capable of aggregating and analyzing large quantities of information from a variety of sources. Take, for example, New
York’s “Domain Awareness System” (DAS), which was unveiled
by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray-

7. See Lev Grossman, Drone Home, TIME MAG., Feb. 11, 2013, at 28, 31–
33; Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are
-watching-you. In the United States, “50 companies, universities, and government organizations are developing and producing some 155 unmanned aircraft
designs.” Id. In 2010, expenditures on unmanned aircraft in the United States
exceeded three billion dollars and are expected to surpass seven billion dollars
over the next ten years. Id.
8. Grossman, supra note 7, at 31.
9. Id. at 28, 32.
10. See id. at 33; John W. Whitehead, Roaches, Mosquitoes and Birds: The
Coming Micro-Drone Revolution, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2013, 12:48 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/micro-drones-b-3084965
.html.
11. Peter Finn, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely
to Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2011, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22/AR2011012204111
.html.
12. Id.
13. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 28.
14. See Lynch, supra note 7 (“[S]ome have forecast that by the year 2018
there will be ‘more than 15,000 [unmanned aircraft systems] in service in the
U.S., with a total of almost 30,000 deployed worldwide.’”). The pizza chain
Domino’s is also taking to the air with a delivery drone. See Pizza-Delivery
Drones? Domino’s Gives it a Shot (NPR radio broadcast June 5, 2013).
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15

mond Kelly in August 2012. Developed in conjunction with
16
Microsoft, DAS aggregates and analyzes video streams from
3,000 public and private security cameras, images from licenseplate readers and traffic cameras, and data from government
17
and private databases. DAS will ensure the surveillance of
New Yorkers and the city as a whole, twenty-four hours a day,
18
seven days a week. Confronted with comparisons to George
Orwell’s “Big Brother,” Bloomberg replied, “What you’re seeing
is what the private sector has used for a long time. If you walk
around with a cell phone, the cell phone company knows where
you are . . . . We’re not your mom and pop’s police department
19
anymore.”
New Yorkers are not the only people being monitored by
increasingly expansive and sophisticated surveillance systems.
The NYPD and Microsoft will be co-marketing DAS for sale to
20
other municipalities. There are also competitors, such as Alabama’s joint venture with Google dubbed “Virtual Alabama,”
which collects and mines information from sources as diverse
as surveillance cameras in public schools, three-dimensional
satellite and aerial imagery, geospatial analytics, sex offender
21
registries, and hospital inventories.

15. Chris Dolmetsch & Henry Goldman, New York, Microsoft Unveil Joint
Crime-Tracking System, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 6:19 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-08/new-york-microsoft-unveil-joint-crime
-tracking-system.html.
16. Id. New York and Microsoft are now marketing the Domain Awareness System to states and municipalities under a profit sharing plan. See Paul
Harris, NYPD and Microsoft Launch Advanced Citywide Surveillance System,
GUARDIAN, Aug. 8, 2012, http://theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/08/nypd
-microsoft-surveillance-system.
17. Dolmetsch & Goldman, supra note 15; see also Jack M. Balkin, The
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008)
(reporting on plans to “mount thousands of cameras throughout Lower Manhattan to monitor vehicles and individuals”).
18. Public Security Privacy Guidelines, N.Y.C. POLICE DEPARTMENT (Apr.
2,
2009),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/
public_security_privacy_guidelines.pdf.
19. NYPD’s ‘Domain Awareness’ Surveillance System, Built by Microsoft,
Unveiled by Bloomberg, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2012, 12:51 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/09/nypd-domain-awareness-surveillance
-system-built-microsoft_n_1759976.html?.
20. Id.
21. Corey McKenna, Virtual Alabama Facilitates Data Sharing Among
State and Local Agencies, DIGITAL CMTYS . (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www
.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Virtual-Alabama-Facilitates-Data-Sharing
-Among.html.
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Regional efforts like DAS and Virtual Alabama supplement
22
a nationwide network of “fusion centers,” which are operated
as joint ventures between governmental agencies and private
stakeholders to monitor, store, and mine the contents of electronic communications, public and private sector databases,
23
health records, video feeds, and histories of online activity.
Along with these government-run ventures, the marketplace is
increasingly populated by for-profit data aggregation companies like ChoicePoint and Acxiom that gather, analyze, package, and sell vast quantities of personal information on hun24
dreds of millions of Americans for public and private clients.
These discrete surveillance technologies and mass data collection efforts offer law enforcement and other government entities powerful tools in their ongoing efforts to prevent, detect,
and prosecute crime, monitor border traffic, and guard against
25
threats from international and domestic terrorists. On the
other hand, they implicate individual and collective expecta26
tions of privacy. These competing interests raise important
questions about the Fourth Amendment status of new and developing surveillance technologies. Should we leave the use of
these technologies to the unfettered discretion of police officers?
Or should we treat their use as “searches” subject to Fourth
Amendment regulation, perhaps including the warrant requirement?
Similar questions came before the Court last year in Unit27
ed States v. Jones. In that case, law enforcement officers used
a GPS-enabled tracking device to monitor Jones’s movements
for four weeks, gathering over 2,000 pages of data in the pro-

22. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for
the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1443 (2011).
23. Id. at 1451; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH SECURITY: PUBLIC HEALTH
AND MEDICAL INTEGRATION FOR FUSION CENTERS 8 (2011), available at
www.it.ojp.gov/docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1450.
24. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595–96
(2004); Natasha Singer, A Data Giant Is Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer
Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1.
25. See David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting
Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745
(2013), for our exploration of some of these interests.
26. See infra Parts I–II (discussing the potential problems with indiscriminate surveillance and how to handle it under the Fourth Amendment).
27. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
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28

cess. Although Jones was resolved on narrow grounds, concurring opinions indicate that at least five justices have serious
Fourth Amendment concerns about law enforcement’s growing
29
30
surveillance capabilities. Those justices insisted that citizens
possess a Fourth Amendment right to expect that certain quantities of information about them will remain private, even if
they have no such expectations with respect to any of the dis31
crete particulars of that information. Thus, even if the use of a
GPS-enabled tracking device to effect “relatively short-term
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets” does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment, “the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on ex32
pectations of privacy.”
According to critics and supporters alike, this quantitative
33
account of Fourth Amendment privacy is revolutionary. In his
majority opinion in Jones, Justice Scalia describes some of the
34
challenges and dangers. Foremost among these is the burden
of explaining quantitative privacy’s Fourth Amendment pedi35
gree. A quantitative approach to the Fourth Amendment appears to undercut well-established rules, including the public
36
observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine. Defenders
of quantitative privacy must chart a conceptual link to these
37
precedents or provide compelling reasons for changing course.
Advocates also must provide a workable test that law enforcement and courts can employ in drawing the line between quantities of data that do and do not trigger the Fourth Amend28. Id. at 948–49.
29. See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
30. We use “citizen” here and throughout this article in a generic, nontechnical sense, to refer to all persons who can assert Fourth Amendment
rights and protections.
31. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In the precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional
nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period
of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken . . . . Devices
like the [GPS-enabled tracking technology] used in the present case, however,
make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”).
32. Id. at 964.
33. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314–15 (2012).
34. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54.
35. Id. at 954. We answer this call in Part II.
36. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.D (analyzing the technology-centered approach alongside the public observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine).
37. We answer this demand in Part IV.
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38

ment. This Article responds to these demands by engaging the
39
Information Privacy Law Project.
Although information privacy law and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence have a shared interest in defining and protecting
privacy, with the exception of a few information privacy scholars, these two fields have largely been treated as theoretically
40
and practically discrete. It is time to end that isolation and
the mutual exceptionalism it implies. For nearly fifty years,
scholars, activists, and policymakers working on information
privacy law have warned about the dangers of surveillance
technologies, including their capacity to chill projects of ethical
self-development that are both core to our liberty interests and
41
essential to a functioning democracy. As we argue here, these
concerns have clear Fourth Amendment salience and provide
critical guidance as courts and legislatures search for ways to
regulate emerging surveillance technologies in the shadow of
Jones.
As a protection afforded to “the people,” the Fourth
Amendment erects a crucial constitutional bulwark against law
enforcement’s tendency to engage in broader and ever more intrusive surveillance when officers and agencies are left to their
42
own discretion. As Justice Jackson pointed out in Johnson v.
43
United States, law enforcement is a competitive enterprise in
38. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. We describe and defend such a test infra
Parts II and III.
39. Neil Richards coined this phrase to refer to the “collective effort by a
group of scholars to identify a law of ‘information privacy’ and to establish information privacy law as a valid field of scholarly inquiry.” Neil M. Richards,
The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1089 (2006) (book review); see also PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 197 (1995) (discussing information privacy
policy entrepreneurs).
40. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility,
Transpareucy, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2008); Neil Richards, The
Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
41. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy,
2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 3–4 (2007), available at http://stlr.stanford
.edu/pdf/freiwald-first-principles.pdf; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1610–16 (1999).
42. See Balkin, supra note 17, at 1, 19 (exploring the “enormous political
pressure” on law enforcement to use advanced surveillance and data mining
technologies); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 556 (1999) (“[T]he larger purpose for which the Framers
adopted the [Fourth Amendment was] to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers.”).
43. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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which government agents will seek any strategic advantage
44
available to them. Pursuit of that advantage impels government agents, even those acting with the best of intentions, to45
ward broader and more intrusive forms of surveillance. Our
eighteenth-century forebears knew well the dangers of leaving
46
these natural motivations unchecked. Before America’s founding, British agents routinely abused general warrants, including writs of assistance, to subject our forefathers to the eight47
eenth-century equivalent of a surveillance state. The Fourth
Amendment responded to these abuses by limiting the right of
law enforcement to effect physical searches and seizures and
the authority of politically driven legislatures and executives to
48
license programs of broad and indiscriminate search.
Granting law enforcement unfettered access to twenty-first
century surveillance technologies like aerial drones, DAS, and
sweeping data collection efforts, implicates these same Fourth
49
Amendment interests. This does not mean that law enforcement should be barred from conducting searches using modern
surveillance technologies. Instead, in the present, as in the
50
past, all that the Fourth Amendment requires is a set of policies and practices that limit the discretion of law enforcement,
provide for meaningful judicial review, and effect a reasonable
accommodation of both the legitimate interests of law enforcement in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting crime, and the
51
privacy interests of citizens subject to surveillance. Here
44. Id. at 14.
45. Id.
46. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“But the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which they
seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some
criminals from punishment.”).
47. See infra Part II.C.
48. See Davies, supra note 42, at 655–60, 668.
49. Infra Parts III.B‒D (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications of
these technologies).
50. See generally Davies, supra note 42, at 578–80 (“Common-law authorities repeatedly gave a consistent reason for condemning general warrants: if
such warrants had been permitted, they would have conferred on ordinary officers discretionary authority to arrest or even to search houses. . . . Hostility
to conferring discretionary search authority on common officers is also the
theme of American complaints about the general writ of assistance.”).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must
balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests
alleged to justify the intrusion.”).
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again, the work of information privacy law scholars offers im52
portant guidance in striking that balance.
Until now, most proposals for defending Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy have focused on a case53
by-case method called the “mosaic theory.” Under this approach, the Fourth Amendment is implicated whenever law enforcement officers gather “too much” information during the
54
course of a specific investigation. Critics of the mosaic theory
have rightly wondered how courts will determine whether investigators have gathered too much information in any given
case and how officers in the midst of ongoing investigations will
know whether the aggregate fruits of their efforts are ap55
proaching a Fourth Amendment boundary. The best solution
that mosaic advocates have so far been able to muster is to
draw bright, if arbitrary, lines based on how long officers use
56
an investigative method or technology. These kinds of solutions fail to satisfy because they are under inclusive, over inclusive, and also sidestep important conceptual and doctrinal
57
questions. We therefore propose an alternative.
Rather than asking how much information is gathered in a
particular case, we argue here that Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy demand that we focus on how information is gathered. In our view, the threshold Fourth
Amendment question should be whether a technology has the
52. See supra note 39.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556–58 (2010) (asserting that the Knotts analysis is limited to the specific facts of the case);
Kerr, supra note 33, at 311; Richard McAdams, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297,
340 (1985); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones
in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8
DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2098002. See David
Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 381 (2013), for our discussion of conceptual, doctrinal, and practical
questions raised by the mosaic theory.
54. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; Gray & Citron, supra note 53, at 390.
55. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54; Gray & Citron, supra note 53, at
408–11; Kerr, supra note 33, at 328–30.
56. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); Slobogin,
supra note 53 (manuscript at 3, 28).
57. See Gray & Citron, supra note 53, at 426–28. Professor Slobogin
acknowledges this concern, but nevertheless favors a regulatory scheme based
on duration of surveillance for purposes of administrability. See Slobogin, supra note 53 (manuscript at 28).
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capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate surveillance that
intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy
by raising the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and
use of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of law
58
enforcement officers or other government agents. If it does
not, then the Fourth Amendment imposes no limitations on law
enforcement’s use of that technology, regardless of how much
information officers gather against a particular target in a par59
ticular case. By contrast, if it does threaten reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy, then the government’s use of
that technology amounts to a “search,” and must be subjected
to the crucible of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, including
judicially enforced constraints on law enforcement’s discre60
tion.
The form and timing of Fourth Amendment constraint under our proposal would depend upon the technology at issue,
the law enforcement interests it serves, and the privacy inter61
ests it threatens. The most common way to implement Fourth
Amendment regulations is to require officers to secure warrants from a detached and neutral magistrate before engaging
62
in a search. For some technologies, that model will remain the
best approach; but it is not the only alternative. Although ultimate authority to review constitutional sufficiency must re63
main with the judiciary as a constitutional matter, our technology-centered approach allows for a range of more bespoke
arrangements. For example, Congress might create a tailored
64
regime along the lines of the Title III Wiretap Act. Alterna58. In proposing a technology-based approach to quantitative privacy, we
are inspired by the work of Susan Freiwald. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 41,
¶ 9 (offering a technology-based approach to regulating government interference with electronic communications).
59. The political branches would of course be free to impose extraconstitutional limitations on the use of these investigative technologies. See
infra Part III.B‒C. That the Fourth Amendment is silent would not at all
prejudice the authority of the political branches to impose extra-constitutional
limitations on the use of investigative technologies that do not implicate quantitative privacy. As we point out below, Congress has taken steps in the past to
regulate the use of wiretaps and pen register devices after the Court declined
to impose Fourth Amendment limitations on the use of these technologies. See
infra notes 456–58 and accompanying text.
60. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948, 950.
61. See infra Part III.
62. See Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV.
904, 915‒16 (2004).
63. Balkin, supra note 17, at 23.
64. See Swire, supra note 62, at 923, 930.
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tively, a law enforcement agency might collaborate with civil
liberties groups and other interested parties to develop regula65
tions and administrative control structures similar to the consent decrees that are often used to resolve constitutional chal66
lenges against police surveillance tactics and practices. As
part of these efforts, designers and developers of surveillance
technologies might incorporate constraints on the aggregation
and retention of data along with use and access limitations,
providing a set of Fourth Amendment pre-commitments that
preserve law enforcement interests while minimizing threats to
67
privacy.
In what follows, we make the case for the right to quantitative privacy and a technology-centered approach to protecting
that right. Part I draws from the Information Privacy Law Project to explain the threats to personality development, democratic participation, and accurate judgments posed by technologies capable of facilitating broad programs of indiscriminate
surveillance. Part II explains the Fourth Amendment relevance
of these concerns. Part III offers concrete proposals for protecting Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy by
considering how our technology-centered approach would apply
to different kinds of surveillance technology. Part IV responds
to objections and challenges.
I. QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY: THE PERILS OF BROAD AND
INDISCRIMINATE SURVEILLANCE
Although concerns about technology’s expanding capacities
to gather and aggregate large quantities of data are new to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, they have for decades been
the focus of the Information Privacy Law Project, a longstanding effort by scholars, practitioners, and activists to understand privacy, its importance to individuals and society, and
68
law’s role in protecting it. As early as the 1960s, contributors
to this project began raising concerns about the privacy impli69
cations of then-nascent computer databases. Public and pri65. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 17, at 24 (suggesting that Congress can
create a group in the Executive branch made up of independent privacy experts).
66. See, e.g., Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1389–92,
1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
67. See infra Part III.C.
68. See sources cited supra note 39.
69. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 158‒63 (1967) (discussing the “current pressures on privacy”).
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vate entities had begun amassing computerized dossiers of
people’s activities that armies of investigators could never have
70
accumulated on their own. Businesses digitized employment,
customer, and medical records; governments generated digital
records on millions of Americans, including “subversives,” Social Security participants, and public benefits recipients; and
direct-mail companies categorized consumers and sold their
71
personal information.
Widespread public anxiety soon emerged about these “Big
72
Brother” computer databases. From 1965 through 1974, nearly fifty congressional hearings and reports investigated a range
of data privacy issues, including the use of census records, access to criminal history records, employers’ use of lie detector
tests, and monitoring of political dissidents by the military and
73
law enforcement. State and federal executives spearheaded
investigations of surveillance technologies including a proposed
74
National Databank Center. Popular culture and public dis75
course was consumed with the “data-bank problem.”
76
This was not lost on the courts. In Whalen v. Roe, a 1977
case involving New York’s mandatory collection of prescription
drug records, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the
Constitution contains a right to information privacy based on
77
substantive due process. Although it held that New York’s
prescription drug database did not violate the constitutional
right to privacy because the gathered information was adequately secured, the Court recognized an “individual interest in
78
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Writing for the
Court, Justice Stevens noted the “threat to privacy implicit in
the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
70. Id.
71. See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY:
COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY (1972) (detailing data practices
of several organizations). Columbia University Professor of Public Law Alan
Westin, serving as Director of the National Academy of Science’s Computer
Science and Engineering Board, helped lead the study of governmental, commercial, and private organizations using computers to amass dossiers on individuals, featuring fourteen case studies after visiting and interviewing fiftyfive organizations. Id. at 5.
72. See REGAN, supra note 39, at 13–15.
73. Id. at 7; NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 71, at 4–5.
74. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 71, at 4–5.
75. See id.; REGAN, supra note 39, at 13.
76. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
77. Id. at 589, 598–600.
78. Id. at 599–600.
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computerized data banks or other massive government files.”
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan warned that the “central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly
increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am
not prepared to say that future developments will not demon80
strate the necessity of some curb on such technology.”
This century’s surveillance technologies pose far greater
threats to privacy than the “Big Brother databanks” of the
twentieth century. Information gathering is faster, cheaper,
81
and more comprehensive than ever before. Whereas information gathered by public and private entities once tended to
remain in information silos, it is now seamlessly shared with
82
countless organizations via the Internet. Aggregation technology and advanced statistical analysis tools have enhanced the
capacities of those who wield surveillance technology to know
83
us, often in ways that we do not know ourselves. Cheap data
storage has virtually eliminated the privacy protections previously afforded by the possibility that past mistakes might be
84
forgotten. Data broker databases, for instance, contain thou85
sands of data points about millions of individuals.
Over the past fifty years, the Information Privacy Law Project has highlighted the dangers posed by these “dataveillance”
technologies and their ability to systematically amass infor86
mation about our daily lives. Scholars have paid particular at79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 605.
Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1459.
Id.
Balkin, supra note 17, at 12; TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM.,
SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, 36–37 (2004)
[hereinafter TAPAC].
84. Balkin, supra note 17, at 13–15.
85. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public
and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241,
246–48 (2007). Data brokers maintain websites custom-tailored for law enforcement that provide access to massive digital dossiers. As an internal document from the United States Marshals Service notes, “With as little as a first
name or a partial address, you can obtain a comprehensive personal profile in
minutes” including Social Security numbers, known addresses, vehicle information, telephone numbers, corporations, business affiliations, aircraft, boats,
assets, professional licenses, concealed weapon permits, liens, lawsuits, marriage licenses, and the like. Hoofnagle, supra note 24, at 596. Data brokers
now combine that information with social media activity scrapped online, store
purchases, and online surfing habits culled from online advertisers.
86. DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF THE SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETY 57–80 (1994). Roger Clarke offered the term “dataveillance” as a way

76

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:62

tention to the damaging effects of surveillance on life projects
central to personal liberty, including individuals’ ethical exploration, identity development, self-expression, and self87
actualization. As they have shown, government surveillance
(or its possibility) causes people to internalize the notion of be88
ing watched, even if it is not actually happening, because
89
“[p]otential knowledge can equal present power.” Government
surveillance constrains “the acceptable spectrum of belief and
behavior,” resulting in a “subtle yet fundamental shift in the
90
content of our character.” People move towards the benign
and mainstream, which threatens “not only to chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen
91
the force of our aspirations to it.” In the face of broad and into conceptualize new forms of surveillance facilitated by the widespread use of
computer-based technology. Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and
Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498, 499, 502–04 (1988). Clarke identified two
forms of dataveillance: (1) personal dataveillance, which involves identifiable
persons who by their actions have attracted the attention of the panoptic system, and (2) mass dataveillance, which refers to gathering of data about
groups of people with the intention of finding individuals requiring attention.
87. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 108 (2008) [hereinafter
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING]; Cohen, supra note 40, at 194–97; TAPAC, supra
note 83, at 35 (“Awareness that the government may, without probable cause
or other specific authorization, obtain access to myriad, distributed stores of
information about an individual may alter his or her behavior. People are likely to act differently if they know their conduct could be observed.”); see DANIEL
J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 44–47 (2004) (discussing the causes of self-censoring) [hereinafter
SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON]. Studies have shown that people experience anxiety
about being watched and misunderstood. Stuart A. Karabenick & John R.
Knapp, Effects of Computer Privacy on Help-Seeking, 18 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 461 (1988).
88. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 87, at 109; Neil M. Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 403–04 (2008). See also GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984 at 4 (1949) (“There was of course no way of knowing whether
you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system,
the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was
even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate
they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live—did
live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you
made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinised.”).
89. TAPAC, supra note 83, at 35.
90. Julie E. Cohen, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND
THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 141 (2012); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425–26
(2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined].
91. Cohen, Examined, supra note 90, at 1426. See also Hubert H. Humphrey, Foreword to EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS, at viii (1967) (“We act differently if we believe we are being observed. If we can never be sure whether
or not we are being watched and listened to, all our actions will be altered and
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discriminate data collection about their daily activities, individuals cannot make meaningful choices about their activities,
preferences, and relations and act on them without fear of em92
barrassment or recrimination. Individual development and
93
expression are inevitably chilled.
The Information Privacy Project has also warned about the
stakes of broad and indiscriminate surveillance for a healthy
94
democracy. Privacy preserves space for engaging in the criti95
cal functions of citizenship. Self-rule requires a “grouporiented process of critical discourse” among autonomous indi96
viduals. The persistent logging of our online activities and ofour very character will change.”); TAPAC, supra note 83, at 35–36 (“The
greatest risk of government data mining is that access to individually identifiable data chills individual behavior . . . changing the legal behavior of U.S.
persons, encouraging conformance with a perceived norm, discouraging political dissent, or otherwise altering participation in political life.”).
92. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 17
(2011); see Gary T. Marx, Identity and Anonymity: Some Conceptual Distinctions and Issues for Research, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 311,
316, 318 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001) (discussing the benefits of
anonymity). Aside from the consequential effects of surveillance technologies,
privacy scholars also emphasize deontological concerns, notably that surveillance technologies demonstrates a lack of respect for its subject as an autonomous person. Stanley Benn explains that being “an object of scrutiny, as the
focus of another’s attention, brings one to a new consciousness of oneself, as
something seen through another’s eyes.” Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom,
and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 1, 7 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1971). The observed person sees herself as a knowable
object, with “limited possibilities rather than infinite, indeterminate possibilities.” Id. Covert surveillance is problematic because it “deliberately deceives a
person about his world, thwarting, for reasons that cannot be his reasons, his
attempts to make a rational choice.” Id. at 10.
93. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 143‒44 (2007); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS.
L.J. 213, 253–55 (2002). As Justice William O. Douglas observed,
“[m]onitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.” United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
94. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 17, at 17–18.
95. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 3–5, 15–17, 66–74 (2005);
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 350 (1996) (discussing a democratic role for privately negotiated identities); Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth
Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2009).
96. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information
and the Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553,
560–61 (1995); see also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 35–36. Paul Schwartz has
relied on the work of constitutional theorist James E. Fleming in arguing that
democracy in general and constitutional law in particular must secure the
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fline travels interferes with civic participation and delibera97
tion. As Spiros Simitis cautions, “neither freedom of speech
nor freedom of association nor freedom of assembly can be fully
exercised as long as it remains uncertain whether, under what
circumstances, and for what purposes, personal information is
98
collected and processed.” For these reasons, privacy advocates
have pressed for laws that can prevent “state or community intimidation that would destroy their involvement in the demo99
cratic life of the community.” In their view, “privacy in public”
100
is indispensable for a functioning democratic society.
preconditions for “‘citizens to apply their capacity for a conception of the good
to deliberat[ions] about . . . how to live their own lives.’” Schwartz, supra note
41, at 1654 (quoting James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1995)). Fleming calls for a deliberative autonomy that is
based on moral autonomy, responsibility, and independence. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30–34 (1995).
97. Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822 (2010). What’s more, a
troubling power imbalance emerges between individuals and the entities that
amass their information. Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 28), available at http://www
.harvardlawreview.org/symposium/papers2012/richards.pdf. Individuals become vulnerable to the whims of powerful entities. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON,
supra note 87, at 44–47. During the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights, antiwar,
and communist activists included on the FBI’s “suspicious persons list” lost
jobs, work opportunities, and licenses, while labor union organizers assumed
new names and Social Security numbers due to fierce hostility to union members. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 71, at 40, 41 (noting that in 1972 the
Social Security Agency (SSA) permitted individuals to assume different identities and new Social Security numbers so that they could avoid prejudice due to
their group affiliations); see, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose
Security? The USA Patriot Act in the Context of Cointelpro and the Unlawful
Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1080–98 (2002) (detailing
and criticizing the FBI's COINTELPRO domestic surveillance program of the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s).
98. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 707, 734 (1987); see also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 34 (explaining
that “awareness that the government may, without individual consent or judicial authorization, obtain access to myriad, distributed stores of information
about an individual may have a chilling effect on commercial, social, and political activity. Informational privacy is, therefore, linked to other civil liberties,
including freedom of expression, association, and religion”).
99. Schwartz, supra note 96, at 561. This is not to suggest that the surveillance of groups is justiciable, although it may be in circumstances where
the chilling of expressive association is accompanied by objective harm, such
as reputational damage. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (refusing to find justiciable constitutional violation for army’s data gathering about
political group because allegations of “subjective ‘chill’” based on possibility
that army may “at some future date misuse the information” are “not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm”); see also Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Associa-

2013]

QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY

79

This is not to say that citizens subjected to invasive surveillance inevitably withdraw from democratic engagement.
101
They may engage in productive resistance or disregard sur102
veillance’s risks on the view that they have nothing to hide.
Nonetheless, the impulse to self-censor is strong when people
have no idea who is watching them and how their information
103
will be used. This is all the more true for traditionally subor104
dinated groups in our post-9/11 age. Because racial, ethnic,
and religious minorities are particularly vulnerable to governmental suspicion and profiling, they are more likely to refrain
from both exploring their own conceptions of the good life and
participating robustly in public life when they are subjected to
105
surveillance. The burden of self-censorship occasioned by a
surveillance state is thus borne unequally. At any rate, democratic participation just should not require heroic levels of civic
courage—such a requirement is both contrary to our constitu-

tion: Political Profiling, Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L.
REV. 621, 656–57 (2004).
100. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 17, at 18; TAPAC, supra note 83, at 36
(“For two hundred years Americans have proudly distrusted their government.
The risk, therefore, of the power to access data from disparate sources is not
merely to informational privacy, but to civil liberties including freedom of expression, association, and religion.”).
101. Kevin D. Haggerty, Tear Down the Walls: On Demolishing the Panopticon, in THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND 23, 34–35
(David Lyon ed., 2006).
102. SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 1.
103. As Frank Pembleton, portrayed by Andre Braugher in the NBC serial
Homicide: Life on the Street, put the point: “[I]f you feel like you’re being
watched, you do what you’re told, especially when you’re being watched by
someone you can’t see.” Homicide: Life on the Street: Fits Like a Glove (NBC
television broadcast Oct. 21, 1994).
104. For example, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme
Court upheld a content-based restriction of speech for offering material support to state-identified terrorist organizations, even if the money was given for
humanitarian efforts. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729–31 (2010).
105. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49
B.C. L. REV. 741, 760–64 (2008) (noting that relational surveillance can “chill
tentative associations and experimentation with various group identities); see
also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 22,
134–54, 158–60, 219 (2003) (exploring the problematic nature of predictive
models when cued by race and gender because they are overused as markers of
difference in morally problematic ways). One might argue that private entities
also have the capacity to suppress by surveillance. We address these concerns
infra Part IV.C‒D.
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106

tional scheme and an undue burden on citizens of a free and
107
democratic society.
Courts operating in the information privacy context have
echoed concerns that broad and indiscriminate surveillance
108
threatens liberty interests. For instance, in Nader v. General
109
Motors Corp., General Motors undertook a campaign to discredit and intimidate its well-recognized critic Ralph Nader.
The company placed him under extensive public surveillance
110
and tapped his telephone. In 1970, the New York Court of
Appeals recognized that, although observing others in public
places generally does not constitute a tort, sometimes “surveil111
lance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable.” As
the court explained, “[a] person does not automatically make
public everything he does merely by being in a public place, and
the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the
right to try to discover the amount of money he was withdraw112
ing.”
The Information Privacy Law Project has also highlighted
problems caused by incorrect or incomplete information
113
amassed in databases. In an early case confronting these issues, United States District Judge Gerhard Gesell ordered the
FBI to refrain from disseminating computerized criminal records for state and local employment and license checks, because
the records were often inaccurate and hence “clearly invade[d]
114
individual privacy.” The court warned of ever more inaccuracies in databases with the “development of centralized state in115
formation centers to be linked by computer to the Bureau.”
Experience has shown that Judge Gesell’s concerns were
well founded. In recent years, employers have refused to interview or hire individuals based on incorrect or misleading per106. TAPAC, supra note 83, at 36.
107. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV.
815, 837 (2000).
108. See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 73–77 (Cal. 1999)
(finding that a television show invaded an employee’s privacy by secretly videotaping his workplace conversations even though other employees could hear
him because employee should not reasonably expect to be secretly recorded by
journalists).
109. 255 N.E. 2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 771.
112. Id.
113. See TAPAC, supra note 83, at 37–39.
114. United States v. Menard, 328 F. Supp. 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
115. Id. at 727.
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sonal information obtained through surveillance technologies.
Governmental data-mining systems have flagged innocent individuals as persons of interest, leading to their erroneous classifications as terrorists or security threats, intense scrutiny at
airports, denial of travel, false arrest, and loss of public bene117
fits. The potential for damage is magnified by our “information sharing environment,” which facilitates the distribution
of such designations with countless public and private actors,
compounding the error in ways that are difficult to detect and
118
eliminate.
Consider the distortions generated by fusion centers that
gather intelligence on “all hazards, all crimes, and all
119
threats.” In one case, Maryland state police exploited their
access to fusion centers to conduct surveillance of human rights
groups, peace activists, and death penalty opponents over a
120
nineteen-month period. Fifty-three political activists eventually were classified as “terrorists,” including two Catholic nuns
121
and a Democratic candidate for local office. The fusion center
shared these erroneous terrorist classifications with federal
drug enforcement, law enforcement databases, and the National Security Administration, all without affording the innocent
targets any opportunity to know, much less correct, the rec122
ord.
116. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 87, at 46–47. Only in exceptional cases do individuals discover their digital dossiers contain erroneous information about them. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1816 n.82 (2010).
117. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249, 1273–77 (2008) (exploring inaccuracies of automated decisionmaking governmental systems including “No Fly,” public benefits, and “dead
beat” parent matching systems).
118. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1443 (describing data inaccuracy
risks, including those linked to data integration attempts). Federal agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security, gather information in conjunction with state and local law enforcement officials in what Congress has
deemed the “information sharing environment” (ISE). Id. The ISE is essentially a network; its hubs are fusion centers whose federal and state analysts collect, analyze, and share intelligence. Id; see TAPAC, supra note 83, at 37–39.
119. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1450.
120. Nick Madigan, Spying Uncovered, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2008, at A1.
121. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1462.
122. Madigan, supra note 120. The ACLU found out about the erroneous
classifications by sheer luck. After activists shared their concerns about being
watched at meetings, it filed open sunshine requests, which eventually yielded
information about the monitoring and the fusion center’s involvement. Once
the press covered the story, the state Attorney General initiated an investigation of the matter, exposing detailed information about the abuse. Danielle
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The dangers of powerful data aggregation and analysis
technologies are not limited to mistakes, of course. If anything,
the threats to liberty and democratic culture are more profound
if they are accurate. On this point, Jack Balkin has argued
that, “Government’s most important technique of control is no
longer watching or threatening to watch. It is analyzing and
123
drawing connections between data.” What is collected need
not be particularly intimate or private, he continues; rather,
“data mining technologies allow the state and business enterprises to record perfectly innocent behavior that no one is particularly ashamed of and draw surprisingly powerful inferences
124
about people’s behavior, beliefs, and attitudes.” From this
level of surveillance, he concludes, government dominance and
125
control follows.
Work done in the information privacy law context provides
ample evidence that programs of broad and indiscriminate surveillance threaten fundamental liberty interests and democratic values. Despite the critical role played by privacy concepts in
contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine, however, there has
been little interdisciplinary engagement between the Information Privacy Law Project and Fourth Amendment law and
126
scholarship. The Court’s decision in United States v. Jones
invites us to end that isolation. The next Part accepts that invitation.

Keats Citron, COINTELPRO in a Digital World, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct.
11, 2008, 3:00 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/10/
cointelpro_in_a.html.
123. Balkin, supra note 17, at 12. This point draws on the work of Michel
Foucault who extended Bentham’s insights to describe how a whole range of
public institutions use surveillance to shape subjects who internalize the
norms and priorities of the institutions in which they are situated. MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195–308 (1975); see also MICHEL
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE
OF REASON (1961).
124. Balkin, supra note 17, at 12. See also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 39–40
(describing how innocuous information, such as special meal requests made to
an airline, can be misused by government surveillance programs to identify
and target individuals based on religious affiliation).
125. Balkin, supra note 17, at 12–15.
126. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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II. QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In a landmark near-decision, the Supreme Court almost
127
held in United States v. Jones that citizens have a Fourth
Amendment interest in quantitative privacy. Although resolved
on narrow grounds, five Justices raised concerns in Jones about
the capacity of surveillance technologies to gather large quanti128
ties of data that reveal personal details about our lives. In the
wake of Jones, critics and skeptics of this quantitative account
of Fourth Amendment privacy have leveled charges of doctrinal
129
radicalism and impracticality. In this Part and the next we
draw on insights from the Information Privacy Law Project to
meet these challenges. We begin with a brief history of Fourth
Amendment doctrine to put Jones in context.
A. QUALITATIVE PRIVACY: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BEFORE
UNITED STATES V. JONES
130

Although not specified in the text, for at least a century
after the Fourth Amendment was ratified, courts defined
131
“search” in reference to concepts of common law trespass. As
a consequence, Fourth Amendment rights were linked to property rights and Fourth Amendment remedies were limited to
132
suits in tort. That changed in the twentieth century with increased urbanization, emerging transportation and communication technologies, and the expansion of professionalized po133
134
lice forces. Olmstead v. United States marks the beginning
135
of the shift.
127. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
129. Kerr, supra note 33, at 314–15, 346–52.
130. The Fourth Amendment provides that: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
131. Slobogin, supra note 53, at 3–4. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2) (arguing that the trespass test of Fourth Amendment search is a
myth created by the Court in Katz (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967))),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_
ID2169926_code810317.pdf?abstractid=2154611&mirid=1.
132. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 786 (1994).
133. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471‒79 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
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Writing for a five-justice majority in Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft held that intercepting telephone conversations was not
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment because the technology used did not require any physical invasion of Olmstead’s
136
home. In a spirited dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that this
property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment was anach137
ronistic. As Justice Brandeis explained, it failed to protect citizens from procedures that might not require the “force and violence” necessary to invade property, but nevertheless
compromised the sanctity of citizens’ thoughts, beliefs, and
emotions as well as the “individual security” they invested in
138
activities like telephone conversations.
Nearly four decades later, Justice Brandeis’s view pre139
vailed in Katz v. United States. There, the Court held that using a listening device to monitor telephone conversations in a
public phone booth constituted a Fourth Amendment “search”
140
despite the absence of a physical intrusion. In rejecting the
trespass requirement, the Court famously declared that, “the
141
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” The Court
found that conversations in public telephone booths deserve
Fourth Amendment protection because citizens expect that
their telephone conversations are just as secure from public re142
view as their daily domestic routines in the home. Although
phone booths are open to public view, the Court noted that they
dissenting); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 460‒61 (2010); see also DAVID R.
JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD 4–9, 29–40 (1979).
134. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
135. Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and
the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 423–24 (2007).
136. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
137. Id. at 473–74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis’ dissent
came as no surprise to students of his groundbreaking article, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), which he co-wrote with Samuel D. Warren.
138. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–74, 478–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[The
Framers] recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
139. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
140. Id. at 353, 358‒59.
141. Id. at 351.
142. Id. at 351–52.
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143

function as spaces of aural repose. Thus, citizens could reasonably expect that their communications in telephone booths
would not be monitored by “uninvited ear[s],” even if they can
144
be seen by “intruding eye[s].”
The other alternative—
declining to extend Fourth Amendment protection at all—
would unsettle these broadly held expectations and raise the
145
specter of a surveillance state.
After Katz, determining whether government conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search” has turned on whether
the person claiming a violation subjectively manifests an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as rea146
sonable. Of course, we enjoy a broader range of reasonable
147
privacy expectations in some places than in others. For example, we harbor strong expectations of privacy in our homes,
148
persons, and immediate possessions.
By contrast, as the
Court has ruled, we have no reason to expect privacy in activi149
ties we “knowingly expose[] to the public.” Between these
endpoints, we have “diminished” expectations of privacy in our
150
151
cars and businesses because our activities in these spaces
are often, but not always, exposed to the public or to regulators.
Under the Katz test, however, the key question in Fourth
Amendment cases is not where a search occurs, but whether
and to what degree it invades reasonable expectations of priva152
cy. This is the qualitative approach to the Fourth Amendment.

143. Id.
144. Id. at 352.
145. Id. at 354–59 (interposing a warrant requirement for electronic eavesdropping and emphasizing that “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to
know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
government agents here ignored ‘the procedure of antecedent justification . . .
that is central to the Fourth Amendment,’ a procedure that we hold to be a
constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in
this case”).
146. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
147. Slobogin, supra note 53, at 5–7.
148. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (discussing the
strong expectation of privacy in one’s home); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (mentioning “persons, houses, papers, and effects” as being specifically protected from
unwarranted searches and seizures).
149. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
150. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 304–05 (1999).
151. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987).
152. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360‒61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Applying this qualitative approach, the Court has formulated two important legal doctrines that are implicated by
United States v. Jones. First, establishing what is known as the
“public observation doctrine,” the Court has held that law enforcement officers can freely make observations from any place
153
where they lawfully have a right to be. Police officers thus
may stand on the street and observe us through open windows,
154
look down on us from public airspace,
and monitor our
155
movements on public roads. Officers may also use devices
156
such as binoculars, telephoto lenses, and beeper-type track157
ers to enhance their observational abilities.
Second, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment
158
cannot save us from “misplaced confidence” in third parties.
Even if we avoid public exposure by only sharing our private
activities with a select few, we run the risk that those people
will violate our trust by sharing the details with law enforce159
ment.
Applying this “third-party doctrine,” the Court has
held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from lawfully obtaining privately recorded conversa160
tions that are disclosed by the recording party, a list of numbers dialed from a customer’s telephone that is obtained by the
161
telephone company using a “pen register,” or lists of financial
162
transactions passed along by a customer’s bank. Part of the
reason why critics dismiss the quantitative approach to privacy
articulated in the Jones concurrences is because it appears to
threaten both the public observation doctrine and the third
163
party doctrine.
153. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989).
154. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
155. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
156. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 251 (1986).
157. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82.
158. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 777 (1971); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
159. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561 (2009) (describing Supreme Court cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to evidence gathered from undercover agents and confidential
informants).
160. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39 (1963); see also United
States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 366–67 (2d Cir. 2003).
161. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979).
162. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). As Part IV discusses,
Congress passed legislation to protect the privacy interests in the contents of
bank records that are not reached by the Fourth Amendment.
163. See infra Part IV.B–D.
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B. A FOURTH AMENDMENT FOOTHOLD FOR QUANTITATIVE
PRIVACY IN UNITED STATES V. JONES
In United States v. Jones, an inter-agency group of law enforcement officers suspected that Jones was a high-level participant in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics in and around the
164
District of Columbia. Jones was cautious, however, which
prevented officers from developing enough direct evidence to
165
justify his arrest and prosecution. Fortunately for them, officers had enough evidence to apply for warrants allowing them
to “tap” his telephone and to monitor his movements with a
166
GPS device attached to his Jeep. These efforts produced several incriminating statements and over 2000 pages of tracking
data showing that Jones made regular visits to stash houses
and other locations tied to the broader drug conspiracy during
167
the twenty-eight day monitoring period. Unfortunately, the
officers violated the terms of their tracking warrant when installing the GPS device, which left the door open for Jones to
168
object to the introduction of this evidence at trial.
Relying on the public observation doctrine, the trial court
169
denied Jones’s motion to suppress. Jones subsequently was
convicted, in part based upon the GPS data, which provided a
170
critical link between him and the alleged drug conspiracy. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
171
Columbia Circuit reversed.
Writing for the panel, Judge
Ginsburg argued that there is a Fourth Amendment distinction
172
between short-term and long-term monitoring.
Although
movements in public can be observed in discrete time slices by
anyone—including law enforcement—Judge Ginsburg pointed
out that “the whole of one’s movements over the course of a
164. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
165. See id. (describing how Government relied on evidence from GPS device to obtain Jones’ indictment and conviction).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 948–49.
168. Id. The GPS tracking warrant issued by the district court required
that the officers install the device on the car registered to Jones’ wife within
ten days of the date on the warrant at any location within the borders of the
District of Columbia. Id. Unfortunately, the officers installed the device on the
eleventh day and in a suburban Maryland parking lot. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 949.
171. Id.
172. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556–57 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
aff’d, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively
173
nil.”
Judge Ginsburg further explained that law enforcement’s
monitoring of a single trip to the store does not reveal much
about the target; but that monitoring “the whole of one’s
174
movements” by contrast paints “an intimate picture of [one’s]
175
life.” Because we have no reason to believe that we are under
176
constant surveillance by any particular person or entity, and
out of respect for the privacy we invest in the totality of our
public movements, Judge Ginsburg concluded that we enjoy a
reasonable expectation that we will be free from constant gov177
ernment surveillance as well. For these reasons, the circuit
178
court vacated Jones’s conviction, holding that, although Jones
173. Id. at 558 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 563 (“A reasonable
person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every time he
drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he stops
and how long he stays there; rather, he expects, each of those movements to
remain ‘disconnected and anonymous.’”).
174. Id. at 558.
175. Id. at 562; see also id. (“The difference is not one of degree, but of kind,
for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction
between a day in the life and a way of like, nor the departure from a routine
that, like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal
even more.”); id. at 563 (“[P]rolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have—short perhaps of his
spouse.”).
176. In an analogous way, state harassment laws and privacy tort law have
reinforced the notion that people can expect to be free from unreasonable surveillance. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998–99 (2d Cir. 1973)
(upholding injunction against a persistent paparazzo); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924
F. Supp. 1413, 1420, 1433–34 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enjoining surveillance of a family on the grounds it was part of “a persistent course of hounding, harassment
and unreasonable surveillance, even if conducted in a public or semi-public
place”).
177. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556 (holding that the public observation
doctrine provides “only that ‘a person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another,’ not that such a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end” (quoting United
States v. Knotts, 160 U.S. 276, 281 (1983))).
178. According to its decretal paragraph, the court “reversed” Jones’s conviction, but one assumes that the court intended to leave open the possibility
of a retrial if the government chose to retry Jones without evidence obtained
by the GPS-enabled monitoring. See, e.g., id. at 568 (“To be sure, absent the
GPS data a jury reasonably might have inferred Jones was involved in the
conspiracy.”). The government did indeed retry Jones without the GPS data,
resulting in a mistrial. Id. The jury was deadlocked. David Kravets, Alleged
Drug Dealer at Center of Supreme Court GPS Case Wins Mistrial, WIRED,

2013]

QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY

89

lacked a discrete Fourth Amendment interest in most of his individual public movements, he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the total quantity of “his movements over the course
of a month,” which was “defeated” by law enforcement’s “use of
179
the GPS device.”
180
The Supreme Court affirmed unanimously. The Court’s
opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice
Roberts with Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, held
that the installation of the GPS device on Jones’s car involved a
search because it was accomplished by a trespass for the pur181
pose of obtaining information. Although the investigating officers had a warrant, they violated its terms, rendering the in182
stallation unreasonable. The majority left for another day the
question of whether monitoring of Jones’s movements using the
183
GPS device raised any additional Fourth Amendment issues.
The concurring opinions, however, left little doubt about which
184
view the Court will take when that day comes.
For himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan,
Justice Alito concurred in Jones to express his skepticism of the
majority’s trespass-based holding and his preference for a
quantitative approach to evaluating Fourth Amendment privaMar. 4, 2013, available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/03/gps-drug
-dealer-retrial/. In May 2013 Jones Agreed to a plea deal with prosecutors for a
15 year sentence with credit for time served. Nick Anderson & Anne E.
Marimow, Former D.C. Nightclub Owner Antoine Jones Sentenced on Drug
Charge, WASH. POST, May 1, 2013, http://failover.washingtonpost.com/local/
antoine-jones-pleads-guilty-to-drug-charge/2013/05/01/1109c268-b274-11e2
-bbf2-a6f9e9d79e19_story.html.
179. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563.
180. Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
181. Id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When the Government does engage in a physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). During the
October 2012 term, the Court confirmed its commitment to preserving physical intrusion as a baseline for determining whether law enforcement conduct
constitutes a “search.” See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
182. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566–67. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S.
10, 13–14 (1948) (holding that, absent emergency or other exceptional circumstance, the Fourth Amendment requires that determinations of reasonableness be made by a judicial officer rather than “zealous officers” who are “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”). Judge
Kavanaugh proposed trespass as a narrower ground for decision in his dissent
from the Circuit Court’s denial of the petition for rehearing en banc. See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–71 (2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
183. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
184. Id. at 954‒64.
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cy interests in the face of new surveillance technologies. For
Justice Alito, the driving concern raised by emerging surveil186
lance technologies is scale.
“In the pre-computer age,” he
points out, “the greatest protections of privacy were neither
187
constitutional nor statutory, but practical.” Long-term surveillance by traditional means was logistically difficult and
188
prohibitively expensive. Its rarity provided citizens with good
reason to expect that they would generally be free from surveillance, and could enjoy a substantial degree of anonymity in the
189
aggregate of their public activities.
Although “short-term
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords
with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as
reasonable,” Justice Alito would have held that “longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
190
expectations of privacy.”
Courts and scholars have described the case-by-case method of evaluating quantitative privacy advocated by Judge Gins191
burg and Justice Alito as the “mosaic” theory. The critical
question under this approach is whether the collection of personal information aggregated by officers during a given investigation violates reasonable expectations of privacy. Responding
to that question on the record before him in Jones, Justice Alito
declined to “identify with precision the point at which the
tracking of [Jones’s] vehicle became a search,” but thought it
clear that “the line was surely crossed before the 4-week
192
mark.”
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence in Jones
to express her support for the majority’s ruling and her sympa185. Id. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 963‒64.
187. Id. at 963.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 963–64. See also Hutchins, supra note 135, at 455–56.
190. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Stephen E.
Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine
of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 547–48 (2005).
191. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
aff’d, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Kerr, supra note 33, at
313. The term “mosaic” is borrowed from national security law, where the
Government has defended against requests made under the Freedom of Information Act on the grounds that when otherwise innocuous intelligence information is aggregated it can reveal secret methods and sources. See generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005).
192. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).

2013]

QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY

91

thy with Justice Alito’s quantitative approach to Fourth
193
Amendment privacy. In terms familiar to information privacy
law scholars, she explained that “GPS monitoring generates a
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, pro194
fessional, religious, and sexual associations.”
Because it
“mak[es] available at a relatively low cost such a substantial
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track,” she
195
worried that it is “susceptible to abuse.”
Further, and echoing concerns expressed by the Information Privacy Law Project, Justice Sotomayor was troubled
that broad deployment of modern tracking technology would
“chill[] associational and expressive freedoms,” while “alter[ing]
‘the relationship between citizen and government in a way that
196
is inimical to a democratic society.’” In addition to modifying
the public observation doctrine, Justice Sotomayor suggested
that providing full protection for Fourth Amendment interests
in quantitative privacy may also require “reconsider[ing]” the
third-party doctrine to prevent the government from simply using private agents to conduct indirectly surveillance that it
197
cannot pursue directly.
The worries expressed by the concurring Justices in Jones
resonate strongly with work done by information privacy law
scholars that explains the value of quantitative privacy for lib198
erty and democracy. Although there have until now been very
few connections drawn between information privacy law and
Fourth Amendment theory and doctrine, the concurring opin199
ions in Jones suggest that these days of isolation are over.
There is, of course, a considerable amount of work that remains
200
to be done. Among the many challenges issued by critics on
193. Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 955.
195. Id. at 956.
196. Id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez,
640 F.3d 272, 286 (2011)); see also Richards, supra note 39, at 1087, 1102–03.
197. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). See generally
Mary Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones—Commercial
Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 331 (2012) (arguing for legislation constraining private entities from gathering and analyzing personal data).
198. Richards, supra note 40, at 1935, 1945‒49; Leary, supra note 197, at
351‒54.
199. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 954‒64.
200. See generally Kerr, supra note 33, 328‒43.
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and off the Court is whether quantitative privacy and the in201
terests it protects have real Fourth Amendment salience. We
answer that challenge in the next section.
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTITATIVE
PRIVACY
Although the value placed in quantitative privacy by information privacy law scholars, practitioners, and advocates
has not yet played a prominent role in Fourth Amendment doc202
trine, the foundations are there. The Fourth Amendment was
conceived, and has long served, as a bulwark against law en203
forcement’s teleological tendency toward a surveillance state.
So too does the Fourth Amendment—on its own and in a
broader constitutional context—treat privacy as essential to
204
liberty and a functioning democracy. Together, these established Fourth Amendment values provide ample ground for extending Fourth Amendment protections to cover reasonable ex205
pectations of quantitative privacy.
206
Like many provisions in the Bill of Rights, the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures and its limitations on warrants have a reactionary origin
207
story. The core text of the Constitution does not provide for
208
individual rights. Although this omission was criticized dur209
ing the drafting process, it received particular attention dur201. Id. at 315, 343–45.
202. See generally Richards, supra note 39.
203. Davies, supra note 42, at 590 (arguing that the framers’ target when
adopting the Fourth Amendment was broad and indiscriminate search programs granting unbounded discretion to executive agents, including general
warrants, which “undermine the right of security in person and house”).
204. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 303, 340–45 (2010).
205. Cf. Leary, supra note 197, at 351‒54 (stating legislative protections for
quantitative privacy should be enacted).
206. Davies, supra note 42, at 673.
207. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 13, 51–78 (1937); Thomas R. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 980
(2011); Davies, supra note 42, at 561‒67, 673‒74.
208. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 83.
209. See, e.g., id. at 84–86; George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of
Government Formed by the Convention 1–2 (1787) (unpublished manuscript)
available at http://virginiamemory.com/docs/hires/masonobjections/pdf (complaining about the absence of a “Declaration of Rights” in the Constitution and
expressing concerns that this omission would effectively moot the declarations
of rights found in the constitutions of the states).
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ing ratification when state legislatures raised concerns about
210
the tyrannical potential of a strong federal government. Their
211
fears were not abstract. Members of these legislatures and
their constituents still bore the scars of constraint and disfavor
at the hands of the Crown and shared a common law consciousness shadowed by the Star Chamber and the torturous
212
abuses of the Tower and the Church. It was against these archetypes of tyranny that the Bill of Rights was drafted and
213
adopted.
The Fourth Amendment drew on these historical experiences to describe limitations on “the amount of power that [our
society] permits its police to use without effective control by
214
law.” During the colonial period, British officials and their
representatives took advantage of writs of assistance and other
general warrants, which immunized them from legal liability
215
for their invasions, in order to search anyone they pleased,
anywhere they pleased, without having to specify cause or rea216
son. James Otis, who famously vacated his office as Advocate
210. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 83, 87–97; Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 400 (1974) (“To
be sure, the framers appreciated the need for a powerful central government.
But they also feared what a powerful central government might bring, not only to the jeopardy of the states but to the terror of the individual.”); Clancy,
supra note 207, at 1034–36.
211. LASSON, supra note 207, at 13, 51‒78.
212. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 24–28, 32; Clancy, supra note 207, at
981, 103–44; c.f. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 313 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing historical abuses of writs); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
62 n.15 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360, 375 (1959) (same).
213. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 13–50; Clancy, supra note 207, at
1002–04.
214. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 377.
215. See Amar, supra note 132, at 767, 774; VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. X
(defining “general warrants” as warrants “whereby any officer or messenger
may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is
not particularly described and supported by evidence”). For an example of a
writ of assistance and the contemporary judicial decisions defending them, see
5 PHILIP KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 223–24
(2000).
216. LASSON, supra note 207, at 51–78; TEDFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24–46 (1969); see Amsterdam, supra note
210, at 367, 388–89, 398; Clancy, supra note 207, at 1002–04; Crocker, supra
note 204, at 350‒53; see also United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.
1930) (“[T]he real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself,
that invasion of a man’s privacy which consists in rummaging about among
his effects to secure evidence against him”).
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General when solicited to defend writs of assistance, described
general warrants in a 1761 court argument as “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English
liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was
217
found in an English law book.” Among those in the audience
for Otis’s speech was a young attorney named John Adams,
who would later be a principal contributor to the text of the
218
Fourth Amendment.
It is therefore no surprise that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” and insists upon warrants issued only “upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de217. James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance, in AMERICAN SPEECHES; THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (Ted Widner ed. 1st ed. 2006). Otis’ objections
to writs of assistance as a form of general warrant focused on breadth and
scope, their inability to limit the discretion of officers who would become petty
tyrants, and the authority to delegate search responsibilities to others, who in
turn might act as tyrants.
In the first place, the writ is UNIVERSAL, being directed “to all
and singular justices, sheriffs, constables and all other officers and
subjects &c.” so that, in short, it is directed to every subject in the
King’s dominions; every one with this writ may be a tyrant; if this
commission be legal, a tyrant may in a legal manner, also, control,
imprison or murder any one within the realm.
In the next place, IT IS PERPETUAL; there’s no return, a man is
accountable to no person for his doings, every man may reign secure
in his petty tyranny, and spread terror and desolation around him,
until the trump of the arch angel shall excite different emotions in his
soul.
In the third place, a person with this writ, in the daytime, may
enter all houses, shops, &c., AT WILL, and command all to assist
him.
Fourth, by this not only deputies, etc., but even their THEIR
MENIAL SERVANTS, ARE ALLOWED TO LORD IT OVER US—
What is this but to have the curse of Canaan with a witness on us, to
be the servants of servants, the most despicable of God's creation?
Id. at 3. As an example of how the authority provided by general warrants can
be abused, Otis then goes on to recount an episode where a certain Mr. Ware
retained delegated authority under a general warrant held by a Mr. Pew.
When Ware was hailed into court to answer an unrelated charge for breach of
the Sabbath, he used the warrant as a license to seek revenge against the constable who arrested him and the judge who presided over his case by subjecting both of their homes to lengthy and invasive searches “from the garret to
the cellar.” Id. at 3–4. Otis’s views were well-founded in the English common
law of the time. See Davies, supra note 42, at 562–63.
218. Clancy, supra note 207, at 979 (“Most of the language and structure of
the Fourth Amendment was primarily the work of one man, John Adams.”).
Responsibility for drafting the text of the Fourth Amendment for the First
Congress fell to James Madison. Davies, supra note 42, at 693–94. There is no
contest, however, that the final text, in both content and structure, was deeply
affected by Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which was
drafted by Adams. Clancy, supra note 207, at 980–81.
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scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
219
be seized.”
Although the negative rights afforded by the Fourth
Amendment have specific historical antecedents, the text itself
evinces a broader historical purpose to protect against indiscriminate and invasive governmental practices that are charac220
teristic of a surveillance state. The protections belong to indi221
viduals and to society as a whole. As Anthony Amsterdam
reports, early English judges saw indiscriminate searches as
offenses not just against individuals, but against the “whole
222
English nation.” For example, instructing the jury in Wilkes
v. Wood—one of the cases widely credited as a guidepost for
those who wrote and ratified the Fourth Amendment—Chief
Justice Pratt warned that, if the power to engage in broad
searches and seizures “is truly invested in the secretary of
state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect
the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is
223
totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.” The Fourth
219. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 388–89;
Clancy, supra note 207, at 152–53; Davies, supra note 42, at 585, 609, 643‒44;
see also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 22 (“One of the colonists’ most potent grievances against the British government was its use of general searches. The hostility to general searches found powerful expression in the [Fourth Amendment to the] U.S. Constitution.”).
220. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“But the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which they
seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some
criminals from punishment.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948) (“The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”); Amsterdam, supra note
210, at 366 (“Looking back to . . . the specific incidents of Anglo-American history that immediately preceded the adoption of the amendment, we shall find
that the primary abuse thought to characterize the general warrants and the
writs of assistance was their indiscriminate quality, the license that they gave
to search Everyman without particularized cause.”).
221. See supra note 220.
222. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 366 n.192.
223. 4
WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
288
(1768)
(“A general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or
particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and void for it's uncertainty; for it is the duty of the magistrate, and ought not to be left to the officer, to judge of the ground of suspicion.”); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L. J. 393, 399 (1995) (quoting Wilkes
v. Wood, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153, 1157 (C.P. 1763)); see also Grumon v.
Raymond, 1 CONN. 40 (1814) (“[T]he law knows of no such process as one to
arrest all suspected persons, and bring them before a court for trial. It is an
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Amendment reflects this societal focus by securing to “the peo224
ple” the right against unreasonable search and seizure. The
Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence enforces these broad
protections by punishing law enforcement in individual cases in
225
order to effect general deterrence against future violations.
Thus, as Renée Hutchins has pointed out, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment . . . erects a wall between a free society and overzealous police action—a line of defense implemented by the
framers to protect individuals from the tyranny of the police
226
state.”
Bear in mind that the tyranny that inspired adoption of
the Fourth Amendment is not necessarily the product of evil in227
tent. Rather, tendencies toward a surveillance state are part
228
of the very purpose of law enforcement. Efforts to ensure
idea not to be endured for a moment. It would open a door for the gratification
of the most malignant passions, if such process issued by a magistrate should
skreen him from damages.”); Huckle v. Money, [1763] 95, Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.)
769 (“To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no
Englishman would wish to live an hour . . . .”).
224. U.S. CONST. amend IV; see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 760
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Today no one perhaps notices because only a
small, obscure criminal is the victim. But every person is the victim, for the
technology we exalt today is everyman’s master.”); Crocker, supra note 204, at
309–10, 360; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal Privacy, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 129 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig eds., 2003) (“By permitting
searches and seizures only if reasonable, and interposing the courts between
the privacy of citizens and the potential excesses of executive zeal, these constitutional protections” help to protect against “dragnets, or general searches,
which were anathema to the colonists who rebelled against the British
crown.”).
225. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (“The rule’s
sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations.”); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1263–72 (1982). For a critique of the
deterrence approach to justifying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
see David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1 (2013) and David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2012).
226. Hutchins, supra note 135, at 444. But see Davies, supra note 42, at
641 (“The principal historical complaint regarding constables was not their
overzealousness so much as their inaction.”).
227. See KURLAND, supra note 215, at 223‒24.
228. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); James
Madison, Speech at the First Congress, First Session: Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 374–75 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1904) (worrying that, absent specific constraint, the federal govern-

2013]

QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY

97

peace and security naturally impel the state toward the most
expansive and efficient means of detecting and preventing
229
crime. In this sense, “The Bill of Rights in general and the
Fourth Amendment in particular are profoundly antigovernment documents [in that] [t]hey deny to government . . .
desired means, efficient means . . . to obtain legitimate and
230
laudable objectives.” But the constraint is necessary because
law enforcement, qua law enforcement, will naturally seek every advantage it can to catch criminals without necessarily con231
sidering the broader consequences for liberty and democracy.
Reduced to a phrase familiar to every student of elementary
school civics, this is the Fourth Amendment’s critical role in our
constitutional system of checks and balances.
The specters of a tyrannical surveillance state that plagued
our founding-era forebears no doubt warranted constitutional
232
attention. They lived in a world in which executive agents
kicked down doors, entered homes, and rummaged through
233
drawers at will. Law-abiding citizens might have hoped that
they were immune from such intrusions, but that would have
234
been naïve. A state interested in maintaining its own author235
ity and ensuring maximum security is not so discriminate. As
ment would revert to the use of general warrants under the “necessary and
proper clause”).
229. See Balkin, supra note 17, at 3–4; Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 378–
79.
230. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 353.
231. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); BAMFORD,
SHADOW, supra note 6, at 111 (describing how NSA surveillance efforts have
expanded rapidly during the cold war and in the wake of the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, “due to limited outside oversight” because it “wanted to
be able to target thousands of people simultaneously, some briefly and some
long term, without the hassle of justifying them to anyone higher than an
anonymous shift supervisor”).
232. See Madison, supra note 228, at 374; Otis, supra note 217, at 1‒5.
233. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765) provided another pre-revolutionary example of what life in such a state might
look like. There, Chief Justice Camden famously wrote that the common law of
England prohibited indiscriminate governmental trespass upon private property and that such invasions could only be justified “by public law” and “for the
good of the whole.” Id.
234. See Madison, supra note 228, at 374‒75.
235. See John F. Mercer, Essays by a Farmer, MARYLAND GAZETTE (Feb.
15, 1788) reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbery J. Storind
ed. 1981) (“[S]uppose for instance, that an officer of the United States should
force the house, the asylum of a citizen, by virtue of a general warrant, I would
ask, are general warrants illegal by the constitution of the United States?
Would a court, or even a jury, but juries are no longer to exist, punish a man
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our founders learned, it will cut a broad swath, targeting not
only criminals but also eccentrics and troublemakers, including
political activists, academics, artists, and promoters of disfa236
vored religions. Today we are relearning the same lesson as
government search programs target everyone who makes phone
237
calls or uses the Internet.
As William Stuntz has pointed out, it was precisely these
broad government attacks on speech and conscience in the context of heresy and sedition cases that informed the substantive
238
character of the Fourth Amendment at its inception. As we
discussed in Part I, the threat of surveillance is a powerful tool
239
for modifying behavior as well as character. Thus illuminated, the Fourth Amendment is revealed as playing a critical role
in our system of constitutional protections because it prohibits
the kinds of broad programs of indiscriminate search that
240
might render docile a people defined by their spirit of liberty.
who acted by express authority, upon the bare recollection of what once was
law and right? I fear not, especially in those cases which may strongly interest
the passions of government, and in such only have general warrants been
used.”).
236. Individuals in these categories have always been the natural targets
of tyranny. The certainly were in the founding era. See Crocker, supra note
204, at 346–50. Writs of assistance in the colonies were little more than protection of petty tyrants, who sometimes used them to retaliate against outspoken citizens. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 59–60. Things have not
changed significantly since. Abusive regimes from Asia to Africa to Europe to
South America have put political opponents, intellectuals, artists, and religious leaders under surveillance, or worse. JEAN-PAUL BRODEUR & STEPHANIE
LEMAN-LANGLOIS, THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILANCE AND VISIBILITY 183–
90 (Richard Ericson & Kevin D. Iagerty eds., 2006). The same impulses of distrust are suffused through our politics. Nixon bugged not drug lords but the
headquarters of his political rivals and civil rights agitators. Nat Hentoff, Forty Years of Growing Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, http://www
.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-any-good-come-of-watergate/since
-watergate-government-surveillance-is-more-sophisticated.
237. These are, of course, the groups targeted by recently revealed surveillance programs directed by the FBI and NSA. See supra notes 1–6, 82–85 and
accompanying text.
238. Stuntz, supra note 223, at 394.
239. See Cohen, supra note 90, at 1425‒26.
240. See Crocker, supra note 204, at 360; see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445, 466–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Fourth Amendment demands that we temper our efforts to apprehend criminals with a concern for
the impact on our fundamental liberties of the methods we use. I hope it will
be a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police surveillance methods
they would sanction were among those described 40 years ago in George Orwell's dread vision of life in the 1980’s . . . .”); BAMFORD, SHADOW, supra note
6, at 31 (quoting NSA head Michael Hayden’s comments on the movie Enemy
of the State: “But I’m not too uncomfortable with a society that makes its boo-
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The concerns about broad programs of indiscriminate
search that drove us to adopt the Fourth Amendment in 1791
are raised anew with law enforcement’s unfettered access to
241
contemporary surveillance technologies. The stakes are profound. Should law enforcement have unrestricted access to
technologies like GPS-enabled tracking, drones, and massive
data aggregation systems capable of effecting broad and indiscriminate surveillance of all of us, all of the time, across every
dimension of our daily lives? Or, in the alternative, does the
Fourth Amendment guarantee to all of us and to each of us the
right not to live in this kind of surveillance state? As we see it,
the Fourth Amendment’s text, history, and doctrine leave no
242
doubt that it is the latter.
The governing standard for determining whether law enforcement conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search” is
described by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in United
243
States v. Katz. Under the Katz inquiry, the Court will recognize a subjectively manifested expectation of privacy as “reageyman secrecy and power. That’s really what the movie’s about—it was about
the evils of secrecy and power . . . making secrecy and power the boogeymen of
political culture, that’s not a bad society”); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling place or other private places . . . . Liberty presumes an
autonomy of the self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.”). Alas, there is already evidence that the surveillance state initiated in the United States over the course of the last decade has
produced precisely this sort of docility, which we feel certain our forefathers
would have deplored. In a recent Pew Research Center poll seeking reactions
to recent revelations about surveillance programs operated by the FBI and
NSA, fifty-six percent of respondents thought it was “acceptable” that the
“NSA [is] getting secret court orders to track calls of millions of Americans to
investigate terrorism.” PEW RESEARCH CTR., MAJORITY VIEWS NSA PHONE
TRACKINGS AS ACCEPTABLE ANTI-TERROR TACTIC 2 (June 10, 2013). Fortunately, the Fourth Amendment stands as a bulwark against docility as well.
See Davies, supra note 42, at 657–60. The very function of constitutionally
guaranteed rights in a constitutional democracy is to prevent the degradation
of those rights by inattention or even by democratic means. Id.
241. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“I also join the opinion because it condemns electronic surveillance, for
its similarity to the general warrants out of which our Revolution sprang and
allows a discreet surveillance only on a showing of ‘probable cause.’”); TAPAC,
supra note 83, at 35 (“The greatest risk of government data mining is that access to individually identifiable data chills individual behavior . . . . This helps
explain the constitutional hostility to general searches—to government surveillance without individualized suspicion—by the government.”).
242. See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text.
243. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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sonable” if it is an expectation that is broadly shared by most
citizens, realistic in light of common social practices, and
244
threatened by unfettered governmental intrusion. From an
ethnographic point of view, it is hard to contest Renée
Hutchins’s observation that “citizens of this country largely expect the freedom to move about in relative anonymity without
the government keeping an individualized, turn-by-turn itiner245
ary of our comings and goings.” There is no doubt that technology capable of pervasive monitoring implicates those rea246
sonable and generally held expectations of privacy. Anthony
Amsterdam perhaps put it best, writing that “[t]he insidious,
far-reaching and indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance—and, most important, its capacity to choke off free human discourse that is the hallmark of an open society—makes
it almost, although not quite, as destructive of liberty as ‘the
247
kicked-in door.’”
* * *
In Part I, we explored how information privacy scholarship has provided theoretical and practical justifications for the
proposition that we can and should maintain expectations of
privacy in large quanta of personal information. In this Part,
we demonstrated that the fundamental concerns for liberty and
democracy that lie at the heart of this work illuminate Fourth
Amendment concerns expressed by the concurring opinions in
United States v. Jones. The next question, then, is how to translate the Fourth Amendment imperative to protect reasonable
248
expectations in quantitative privacy into practice. We take up
that challenge in the next Part.
244. See id. at 361; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12
(1986) (applying the social inquiry prong of justice Harlan’s reasonable expectations of privacy test).
245. Hutchins, supra note 135, at 455; see also Jones v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963–64 (Alito, J.,
concurring). One might argue that, as a descriptive matter, emerging surveillance technologies make it unreasonable to expect this level of privacy. As we
argue below, this amounts to “technological determinism run amok.” See infra
notes 387–92 and accompanying text.
246. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 759–60 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdropping. They
make it more penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free
society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient; and police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.” (quoting Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
247. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 388.
248. Balkin, supra note 17, at 23; Kerr, supra note 33, at 330–54.
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III. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH TO
QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY
Fourth Amendment debates about quantitative privacy
have so far been dominated by discussion of the “mosaic” theo249
ry. Under the mosaic theory, Fourth Amendment interests
would be determined on a case-by-case basis by assessing the
quality and quantity of information about a suspect gathered in
250
the course of a specific investigation.
The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted this ap251
proach in the predecessor to Jones. The concurring opinions
252
in Jones also appear to endorse the mosaic theory. In the
months after Jones, prominent quantitative privacy advocates
have come forward to expand, explore, and defend the mosaic
253
approach. At the same time, the mosaic approach has been a
target for pointed criticism on both doctrinal and practical
254
grounds. We think that the Fourth Amendment and the privacy issues at stake, as we have described them here, suggest
taking a different tack.
In our view, the threshold Fourth Amendment question
raised by quantitative privacy concerns is whether an investigative technique or technology has the capacity to facilitate
broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that raise the
specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that
255
technology is left to the unfettered discretion of government.
There are a number of ways that the Fourth Amendment status of a surveillance technique or technology could be determined. The most obvious would be for anyone who knows that
he or she has been subject to surveillance by a novel technology, or dramatically improved existing technology, to file a civil
256
suit seeking equitable relief or even damages. In such an ac249. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54; Kerr, supra note 33, at 330–54;
Slobogin, supra note 53, at 3.
250. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 53, at 3.
251. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
aff’d United States v. Jones, 132 U.S. 945 (2012).
252. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito,
J., concurring).
253. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 53, at 3–4, 12–23.
254. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54; Kerr, supra note 33, at 330–54.
255. See Freiwald, supra note 41, at 15–18 (arguing for a Fourth Amendment focus on surveillance technologies).
256. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1338 (2013) (holding that
Article III requires that a party seeking to challenge the constitutionality of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or executive conduct licensed
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) must have actual
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tion, a court would first need to determine whether the technology at issue should be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. Among the important factors that a court would need to
consider are: (1) the inherent scope of a technology’s surveillance capabilities, be they narrow or broad; (2) the technology’s
scale and scalability; and (3) the costs associated with deploying and using the technology. If a court finds that a challenged
technology is capable of broad and indiscriminate surveillance
by its nature, or is sufficiently inexpensive and scalable so as to
present no practical barrier against its broad and indiscriminate use, then granting law enforcement unfettered access to
that technology would violate reasonable expectations of quan257
titative privacy.
The critical goal, of course, will be to tailor an approach
that satisfies Fourth Amendment standards by reflecting a
clear understanding and appreciation of both the law enforce258
ment and privacy interests at stake.
Once a surveillance technology has been identified as implicating the Fourth Amendment, and a reasonable approach to
limiting law enforcement’s access and discretion has been devised, subsequent litigants would have the option of challenging law enforcement’s conformance with the regulatory scheme
(be it a warrant regime or some other means), the constitutionality of law enforcement’s conduct regardless of the scheme, or
both. For students of criminal procedure, there is no surprise
here. After all, defendants subject to physical searches of their
homes are at liberty to challenge the constitutionality of local
259
260
warrant procedures, the constitutionality of a warrant, and
knowledge that he, she, or it is subject to surveillance under FISA, an order of
the FISC, or both, in order to establish standing). Although it is not necessary
to our argument here, we see no reason why any citizen could not bring a
Fourth Amendment claim challenging law enforcement’s unfettered access to
a surveillance technology or the Fourth Amendment sufficiency of a legislative
or executive regulatory scheme governing law enforcement’s access to a surveillance technology. After all, each of us has an equal share in the right of the
people to be secure from the vagaries of a surveillance state.
257. See supra Parts I‒II.
258. In other work, we have described in detail and at length some of the
law enforcement interests served by many emerging surveillance and data aggregation technologies. See generally Gray, Citron & Rinehart, supra note 25.
259. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 246 (1977) (challenging
constitutionality of local procedure whereby magistrates were only paid if they
issued a warrant); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (challenging local practice of allowing law enforcement officials to issue warrants).
260. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (challenging warrant for licensing overly invasive search); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
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even the constitutionality of law enforcement’s conduct during
261
a warranted search. Thus, although the technology-centered
approach to conceptualizing and defending Fourth Amendment
rights to quantitative privacy proposed here is novel, its application would not require straying from well-traveled litigation
pathways.
In this Part, we elaborate further how this technologycentered approach would work in practice by considering how it
would apply to emerging surveillance technologies, such as aerial drones, GPS-enabled tracking, the NSA’s telephonic and data surveillance programs, and the NYPD’s Domain Awareness
System, and how it would apply to traditional investigative
methods like human surveillance. We begin by explaining the
Fourth Amendment pedigree of our technology-centered approach.
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENTS FOR A TECHNOLOGYCENTERED APPROACH
The Fourth Amendment guards against the government’s
unfettered use of techniques and technologies that raise the
262
specter of a surveillance state. For our forebears, those fears
arose in reaction to the broad and indiscriminate use of physi263
cally invasive searches and seizures. Today, the risk of a surveillance state arises with law enforcement’s unfettered access
to advanced surveillance technologies, including aerial drones,
GPS-enabled tracking devices, and data aggregation and min465 (1976) (challenging warrant for licensing overbroad search).
261. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (challenging
law enforcement’s failure to “knock and announce” when conducting a warranted search); Hummel-Jones v. Strope, 25 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1994)
(challenging length of time individuals on the scene of a warranted search
were detained).
262. See generally Crocker, supra note 204.
263. Stuntz, supra note 223, at 402–03 (1995). See also Davies, supra note
42, at 578–82, 736 (“The common-law tradition viewed any form of discretionary authority with unease—but delegation of discretionary authority to ordinary, ‘petty,’ or ‘subordinate’ officers was anathema to framing-era lawyers;”
and “[the Framers] banned general warrants in order to prevent the officer
from exercising discretionary authority.”); James Madison, Amendments to the
Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197, 205
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1979) (“It is true the powers of the general government are circumscribed; they are directed to particular objects; but even if
government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with
respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the
same manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions
may to an indefinite extent.”).
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ing projects like DAS, fusion centers, and NSA’s telephonic and
264
data surveillance programs.
In her concurring opinion in
Jones, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the democratic consequences of these technologies, which can capture “at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information
about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered dis265
cretion, chooses to track.” The Information Privacy Project’s
concerns animate Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones. Informed by the project’s work, we see strong Fourth Amendment
grounds for regulating government’s access to and use of investigative technologies that are capable of broad and indiscriminate data collection, data retention, data analysis, and direct
266
monitoring because they are “inimical to democratic society.”
Although it has not squarely addressed the issue, existing
Supreme Court doctrine exhibits considerable sympathy for the
proposition that emerging technologies capable of amassing
large quantities of information about individuals implicate
267
Fourth Amendment bulwarks against a surveillance state. In
264. Cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“What the ancients knew as ‘eavesdropping,’ we now call ‘electronic
surveillance’; but to equate the two is to treat man’s first gunpowder on the
same level as the nuclear bomb. Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler
of human privacy ever known. . . . [T]he concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly
allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and
other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to
shield them from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them
the health and strength to carry on.”).
265. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 312–13 (1972)
(“[A] recognition of these elementary truths does not make employment by
Government of electronic surveillance a welcome development—even when
employed with restraint and under judicial supervision. There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be
used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. We look to the
Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy . . . . [Katz] implicitly recognized that
the broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth
Amendment safeguards.” (citations omitted)); White, 401 U.S. at 760 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (“I would stand by Berger and Katz and reaffirm the need for
judicial supervision under the Fourth Amendment of the use of electronic surveillance which, uncontrolled, promises to lead us into a police state.” (citation
omitted)); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (“[T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the
privacy of the individual . . . indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.” (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963)
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the years since the Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1791,
courts routinely have been called upon to evaluate the potential
of emerging investigative techniques and technologies to dimin268
ish privacy. When unfettered access to those methods raises
the specter of a surveillance state, courts have limited their use
by applying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness stand269
270
ards. For example, in United States v. Knotts, the Court indicated that “dragnet type law enforcement practices” might
271
threaten broadly held privacy expectations. The technological
capacity to effect pervasive surveillance was also at issue in
United States v. Kyllo, which concerned the use of a heat detection device to monitor invisible thermal emanations from a
272
home. Writing for the Court in Kyllo, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Court must not “permit police technology to
273
erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment,” including existing technologies and “more sophisticated systems
274
that are already in use or in development.”
Our technology-centered approach to protecting quantitative privacy follows this familiar doctrinal path, invoking the
Fourth Amendment to guard against indiscriminate intrusions
that compromise individuals’ “power to control what others can
275
come to know” about them. In the sections that follow, we explain how that general approach would apply to investigative
technologies and methods like drones, DAS, the NSA’s data
surveillance programs, and human surveillance.
B. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE DRONES
If an image could serve as the paradigm of the surveillance
276
state, it would be the all-seeing government eye in the sky.
(Warren, J., concurring))).
268. BREYER, supra note 95, at 67.
269. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
270. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
271. Id. at 284. For further discussion of Knotts, see infra notes 410–29 and
accompanying text.
272. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
273. Id. at 34.
274. Id. at 36.
275. BREYER, supra note 95, at 66.
276. For example, the seal for the Office of Information Awareness, which
developed and operated the notorious Total Information Awareness system
through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, features an image of
an eye atop a pyramid, similar to that which is found on the back of the one-
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Drones implicate Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative
privacy because they can facilitate exactly this kind of broad
and indiscriminate surveillance when their deployment and use
is left to the unfettered discretion of government agents. We
turn first to considerations of scope. Although an individual
277
drone can only monitor what it can see, it can see quite a lot.
Furthermore, unlike manned aircraft, drones can stay aloft for
long periods of time, providing constant streams of information
278
for nearly indefinite periods of time. The technology is also
highly scalable and increasingly inexpensive, promising an ever-expanding fleet of drones creating an ever-broadening sur279
veillance net in the skies above us. Thus, there appears to be
no real limit on the breadth of surveillance that drones can accomplish.
In addition to being broad, surveillance accomplished using
drones is indiscriminate in that everyone within the field of the
drones’ vision is under constant surveillance regardless of
whether there is reason to suspect any particular person of
280
wrongdoing. Drones are also covert by design. Thus, even if
some places end up being unmonitored some of the time, the
ambient threat of unlimited surveillance by drones would remain ubiquitous and constant. It is hard to think of a better description of life in a surveillance state than to know that no
matter where you go, and no matter when, there is an eye-in281
the sky that is or may be watching you. For these reasons, we
dollar bill, casting its lighted vision on the planet earth. See Hendrik
Hertzberg, Too Much Information, NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2002, http://www
.newyorker.com/archive/2002/12/09/021209ta_talk_hertzberg.
277. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 32 (reporting that the Reaper drone
outfitted with a Gorgon Stare device can “surveil an area 2 ½ miles across
from 12 angles at once”).
278. Id. at 33 (reporting on one drone, the manufacturer of which “promises
‘more than 21 days of unblinking stare’” and another in development that will
stay aloft for five years); see also News Release, Northrop Grumman, Northrop
Grumman Awarded $517 Million Agreement for U.S. Army Airship with Unblinking Eye, (June 14, 2010), available at http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/
pages/news_releases.html?d=194252.
279. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 28 (reporting that drones retail for as
little as $300); see also Darrell Preston, Drones Take to American Skies on Police, Search Missions, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-05-31/drones-take-to-american-skies-on-police-search-missions
.html (comparing cost of some drones to squad cars).
280. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 33 (reporting development of a “tiny
drone that mimics the flight of a hummingbird”).
281. See ORWELL, supra note 88, at 4 (“There was of course no way of
knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or
on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was
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think that unfettered governmental access to drones subject only to the discretion of government agents implicates reasonable
interests in quantitative privacy; the deployment and use of
drones should therefore be subject to Fourth Amendment regu282
lation.
A determination that drones implicate Fourth Amendment
interests in quantitative privacy would not bar law enforcement from using the technology. Rather, what would be prohibited is its “unreasonable” use. For Fourth Amendment purposes, “reasonableness” requires balancing the legitimate interests
283
of law enforcement against the privacy interests of citizens.
Just as in more familiar Fourth Amendment contexts, applying
this balancing test as part of a technology-centered approach to
quantitative privacy requires finding a regulatory structure
that can preserve the investigative utility of drones while minimizing their risk for abuse. What does that mean in practice?
When considering the options, it is important to distinguish between surveillance in the context of a specific investigation and ambient, general surveillance with no particular
target in mind. Like physical searches, wiretapping, and GPSenabled tracking, drones are well-suited to the surveillance of
particular suspects or crimes. For example, drones might help
284
officers track a suspect or study a crime scene. By contrast,
the threat to quantitative privacy posed by drones derives primarily from the prospect of their broad and indiscriminate use
guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time.
But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You
had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that
every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.”); see also Grossman, supra note 7, at 31 (describing the experience of being watched by a drone as “eerie, oppressive, and somewhat annoying”); INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC: STANFORD
LAW SCH. & GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC: NYU SCH. OF LAW, LIVING UNDER
DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN 80‒87 (2012), available at http://livingunderdrones.org/wp
-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-nyu-living-under-drones.pdf (describing the
mental and emotional impact of constant drone surveillance on residents of
Pakistan).
282. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 32 (“The framers didn’t anticipate
technology that could hover for days, keeping an eye on exposed backyards
and porches, that could work in networked swarms, see through walls with
thermal imaging, recognize faces and gaits and track license plates.”).
283. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997); see also Freiwald,
supra note 41, at ¶ 67.
284. Christina Hernandez Sherwood, Are You Ready for Civilian Drones?,
GOV’T TECH. MAG., Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/are
-you-ready-for-civilian-drones.html.
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in the context of general surveillance programs. Given this dynamic, the best place to strike a reasonable balance between
the privacy and law enforcement interests at stake in the use of
drones is likely to be at the time of deployment. Experience
with wiretapping technology provides a helpful and illuminating analogue.
Wiretapping technology has proven to be useful to law en285
forcement as a surveillance tool in specific investigations. On
the other hand, wiretapping is also capable of facilitating broad
programs of indiscriminate surveillance. The Verizon order discussed above suggests that the NSA is collecting and analyzing
286
our telephony metadata. Imagine that government was also
listening to the content of our telephone conversations, remi287
niscent of the Bush-era “Terrorist Surveillance Program.”
There is no doubt that such a program would violate reasonable
expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment
precisely because it entails the broad and indiscriminate use of
a surveillance technology.
To preserve reasonable expectations of privacy threatened
by unfettered access to wiretapping technology, while still preserving legitimate law enforcement interests, Congress, acting
288
in the shadow of United States v. Katz, passed the Title III
285. Declan McCullagh, FBI to Announce New Net-Wiretapping Push,
CNET (Feb. 16, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20032518-281.html.
286. See Greenwald, Phone Records, supra note 1.
287. BAMFORD, SHADOW, supra note 6, at 177–96 (describing NSA’s warrantless program of collecting vast streams of international and domestic email and phone traffic passing through U.S. telecommunications pathways);
David E. Sanger & John O’Neil, White House Begins Effort to Defend Surveillance Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/
23/politics/23cnd-wiretap.html?_r=1&. Congress immunized from liability the
telecommunication providers involved in the TSP program. See Congress
Grants Telecommunications Companies Retroactive Immunity from Civil Suits
for Complying with NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program—FISA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1271,
1271–72 (2009). There is indeed no assurance that the data collected through
that program has been discarded. In April 2012, national security author
James Bamford reported that the NSA is spending two billion dollars to construct a data center in Utah to store the information it has been collecting for
the past decade. Bamford, The NSA is Building, supra note 6. According to
Bamford, “[f]lowing through its servers and routers and stored in nearbottomless databases will be all forms of communication, including the complete contents of private emails, cell phone calls, and Google searches, as well
as all sorts of personal data trails—parking receipts, travel itineraries,
bookstore purchases, and other digital ‘pocket litter.’” Id.
288. 389 U.S 347, 353 (1967) (announcing that “the underpinnings of
Olmstead,” which held that wiretapping does not implicate the Fourth
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Wiretap Act and then the Electronic Communications Privacy
289
Act (ECPA). Under this legislative regime, law enforcement
can only use wiretapping technology if they have prior approval
290
of a court. Applications for wiretap warrants must describe
the crime under investigation, identify the “communications
sought to be intercepted,” and provide details on where and
291
how those communications will be intercepted. A court will
issue a wiretap order only where it determines that there is
“probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a particular [enumerated] offense;” “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;” and that “normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely
292
to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” Wiretap orders
293
must be narrowly tailored and time limited. Courts also have
the authority to require regular reports during the pendency of
a wiretap warrant and to modify the terms as investigations
294
unfold.
This congressionally devised approach to wiretaps offers a
promising model for regulating law enforcement access to other
direct surveillance technologies, including drones and GPSAmendment because it is “surveillance without any trespass . . . have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling,” but declining to directly overrule
Olmstead because the facts before the Court did not require doing so); see also
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (“After Katz, Congress did
not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law governing [wiretapping]. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive
statute, and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has been governed
primarily by statute and not by case law.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
289. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat. 197, 197–239; see also GINA STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING (Oct. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/98-326.pdf.
290. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), (2) (2012).
291. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iii).
292. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1)(a)–(s), 2518(3).
293. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), (5).
294. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6). Many of these minimization standards were
hailed by the Court in Katz as the sorts of efforts that, if subject to prior approval of a detached and neutral magistrate, would strike a reasonable balance between law enforcement’s interests in conducting electronic eavesdropping and the privacy interests threatened by this kind of surveillance. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354–55 (1967).
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enabled tracking devices. Three features of this scheme seem
particularly useful to consider. The first is its legislative provenance. Although courts are constitutionally obligated to ensure
that Fourth Amendment standards are met, and any legislative
scheme would ultimately be subject to court review, there is no
295
bar on the political branches’ taking the first step. Justice
Alito, writing for four justices in Jones, solicited just this kind
of legislative action to regulate the use of GPS-enabled tracking
296
technology. We share his inclination, particularly in the context of emerging surveillance technologies, because the law enforcement and privacy interests at stake can be explored in a
more expansive and timely manner in the context of legislative
or executive rule making processes than they can be in the con297
text of constitutional litigation.
Second, the Wiretap Act only allows officers to use wiretaps during the course of specific investigations and only where
there is probable cause to believe that the wiretap will produce
298
evidence. Thus, officers are provided reasonable access to the
technology when and where it can advance demonstrable law
enforcement interests while also securing our general expectations that government is not listening to all of our telephone
conversations. This seems like a fair compromise in the context
of other direct surveillance technologies like drones and GPSenabled tracking. For example, drone surveillance might be
tremendously valuable in a case like Jones because it would allow officers to document a suspect’s pattern of travel between

295. Cf. Orin Kerr, Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb
and Swire, 102 MICH. L. REV. 936, 943 (2004) (arguing that Congress can and
should legislate on privacy rights with respect to developing technologies, rather than leaving interpretation to the courts).
296. United State v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change,
the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is
well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.” (citation omitted)).
297. Id.; cf. Announcement, Fed. Aviation Admin., Unmanned Aircraft Systems Test Site Selection (Feb. 14, 2013), available at https://faaco.faa.gov/
index.cfm/announcement/view/13143 (seeking public and expert opinions on
rules governing drones in domestic airspace). Two bills working their way
through Congress, S. 607 (2013) and H.R. 1852 (2013), would amend the Electronic Communication Privacy Act to require that law enforcement secure a
warrant based on probable cause before accessing any stored electronic communications no matter their age. Current law only requires a warrant for
stored communications that are less than 180 days old. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
298. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b)–(c).
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locations associated with a drug conspiracy. Drones might
serve an important purpose when used to monitor international
300
borders. In either case, requiring officers to obtain prior authorization from a court would serve legitimate law enforcement interests while also limiting access to circumstances of
301
specific and demonstrated need. That constraint would in
turn preserve reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy
by allowing the vast majority of us to remain secure against the
prospect that law enforcement “in its unfettered discretion” was
using drones or GPS-enabled tracking devices to gather “at a
relatively low cost . . . a substantial quantum of intimate in302
formation” about all of us all of the time.
Third, the Wiretap Act requires that courts tailor warrants
303
and exercise appropriate supervisory authority. Applied to
drones, GPS-enabled tracking, and similar technologies, this
requirement might mean setting limits on when, how, and how
long a device can be deployed. A court might also require officers to take steps to minimize information about innocent third
304
parties that is gathered incidentally.
As in all Fourth
Amendment cases, the guiding principle would be to strike a
reasonable balance between the investigative needs of law enforcement and the privacy interests of the suspect and society
305
at large.
299. See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
300. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 31.
301. As with physical searches, imposing a warrant-type constraint on the
deployment and use of aerial drones would not bar the use of these technologies without prior court approval in emergency situations. See Kentucky v.
King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400
(2006).
302. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
303. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6).
304. For example, wiretap orders frequently require that officers monitoring the tap make an initial assessment of relevance to their investigation and
stop or erase any recordings that are not relevant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (requiring minimization of interception of irrelevant information); cf. United
States v. Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d 457, 462 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that interpreters that ceased translating recorded conversations after those parts already translated were found to be irrelevant comported with the level of minimization required by the wiretapping order).
305. It is no coincidence that this was precisely the approach taken during
the investigation of Jones. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The investigating officers sought and received a warrant to install and monitor a GPS device on
Jones’s car. Id. In keeping with habits developed in the wiretapping context,
the court set limits on where and when the device could be installed and how
long it could be monitored. See id.
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In recommending some form of prior authority granted by
a court as the primary tool for regulating law enforcement access to direct surveillance technology, we are far from radical.
This is, after all, the primary strategy for limiting physical
searches (particularly in the home), wiretaps, and searches of
306
stored electronic communications. Based on this experience,
it seems that requiring officers to seek prior approval of a court
before using direct surveillance technologies like aerial drones
is far from unreasonable. In fact, the officers in Jones sought
and received a warrant before installing the GPS-enabled
307
tracking device on Jones’s car. They unfortunately failed to
obey the terms of that warrant, but no evidence in the record
suggested that it was onerous or unreasonable from a Fourth
Amendment point of view to expect them to get a warrant in
308
the first place. Quite to the contrary, that is precisely what
309
the Supreme Court ultimately required. At the same time,
however, it is clear that the natural impulse of government and
law enforcement to expand surveillance capacities is now dom310
inating the debate about drones. Absent constitutional constraint, there may be little to protect us against skies filled
with ever-watchful government eyes.
C. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND DATA
AGGREGATION
Data aggregating and mining technologies like DAS, the
NSA’s telephonic and electronic surveillance programs, fusion
centers, and Virtual Alabama implicate reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy principally because of their scope.
Such technologies are, after all, designed to collect and analyze
large quantities of data from disparate sources to construct “an
intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to
311
have.” For DAS in particular, there can be no doubt about its
capacity to facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveil-

306. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (discussing how
court-imposed limitations on warrants for physical searches ensure the constitutionality of those searches).
307. 132 S. Ct. at 948.
308. See generally id.
309. Id. at 954.
310. For example, sections 331 to 334, and 903 of the FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 658, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012), dramatically
expands access to, use of, and research into aerial drones in domestic airspace.
311. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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lance. As Mayor Bloomberg told reporters when unveiling the
program:
Investigators will have immediate access to information through live
video feeds, and instantly see suspect arrest records, 911 calls associated with the suspect, related crimes occurring in the area and
more . . . . Investigators can track where a car associated with a suspect is located, and where it has been in past days, weeks or
312
months . . . .

Although the Court has yet to consider the Fourth
Amendment implications of data aggregation and data mining
technologies, it has highlighted the privacy concerns at stake in
other constitutional and statutory contexts. For example, in
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
313
Freedom of the Press the Supreme Court assessed the reach
of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption 7(c), which
prohibits federal disclosure of “records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes” that could “reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal priva314
cy.” The Court held that the exemption prohibited disclosure
of FBI “rap sheets” to the media even though these records are
compiled entirely from information already available in public
315
records. In reaching that result, the Court focused on the expanding capacity of database technology to aggregate and store
316
mass quantities of personal data. The Court saw “a vast difference between the public records that might be found after a
diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local
police stations throughout the country and a computerized
317
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”
The privacy interest in criminal rap sheets was deemed “substantial” under FOIA because “in today’s society the computer
can accumulate and store information” to such an extent and
degree that it violates a “privacy interest in maintaining the
318
practical obscurity” of that information. This, of course, was
312. Matt Williams, New York City Shows New Law Enforcement Technology, GOV’T TECH., Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/New
-York-City-Shows-New-Law-Enforcement-Technology.html.
313. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
314. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(C).
315. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 767 (1989) (2012).
316. Id. at 770.
317. Id. at 764.
318. Id. at 780; see also Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The
Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1597745 (importing the
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320

in 1989. The technologies for both data gathering and data
321
storage have increased in power on an exponential scale over
the intervening years, measured now not in bytes or mega322
bytes, but in zettabytes and yottabytes, while costs have fall323
en past negligible.
The political branches have also wrestled with the privacy
consequences of data aggregation technologies. In 1973, the
notion of practical obscurity from Reporters to the private collection of online
personal data).
319. See generally 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
320. Scott Shane, Data Storage Could Expand Reach of Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES: THE CAUCUS BLOG (Aug. 14, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs
.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/advances-in-data-storage-have-implications-for
-government-surveillance/ (reporting that “the technology to capture and store
such data is no longer a limiting factor [for the Data Awareness Program]”).
By their nature, data aggregation systems take advantage of existing surveillance pathways, and therefore require very little additional costs. For example, the recently revealed program operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency gathering metadata for all telephonic
communications in the United States costs the government nothing because
the data is gathered by telephone companies and passed to the National Security Agency under order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. See In
re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Productino of Tangible
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. on Behalf of MCI Commc’n
Servs., Inc., No. BR13-80, at 1 (FISA Ct., Apr. 25, 2013) (unpublished), available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/Verizon
-telephone-data-court-order. So too, the much broader data collection efforts
reported by James Bamford and described by whistleblower Edward Snowden
providing government access to the contents of virtually every electronic communication that travels through the United States. See Glenn Greenwald,
Ewen MacAskill, & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN, June 9, 2013, http://www
.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower
-surveillance; see also Bamford, The NSA is Building, supra note 6.
321. See Shane, supra note 320 (reporting that “[t]he estimated cost of storing on gigabyte of digital data, adjusted for inflation to 2011 dollars, fell from
$85,000 in 1984 to 5 cents in 2011”). In 2011, a report from the Brookings Institute estimated that it would cost the government 17 cents on a per capita
basis to store all telephone conversations conducted in the United States, falling to 2 cents by 2015. JOHN VILLASENOR, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, RECORDING EVERYTHING: DIGITAL STORAGE AS AN ENABLER OF AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS 4 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/12/14%20digital%
20storage%20villasenor/1214_digital_storage_villasenor.pdf. Although the estimated cost for constructing NSA’s Cybersecurity Data Center at Camp Marshall in Utah is estimated at $2 billion, its storage capacity will be measured
21
24
in zettabytes (10 bytes) or yottabytes (10 bytes), making it a bargain even
by those projected 2015 cost standards. See Bamford, The NSA is Building,
supra note 6.
322. See Bamford, The NSA is Building, supra note 6.
323. See supra notes 320–21 and accompanying text.
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Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
issued a report specifying the privacy concerns raised by computerized collections of personal data and offering a code of
“fair information practices” that would provide procedural safe324
guards against the technology’s inherent potential for abuse.
Embodying those fair information practices, the Privacy Act of
1974 (Privacy Act) prohibited federal agencies from maintain325
ing secret systems of personal records and from amassing
326
personal information without a proper purpose. Many information privacy laws also require opt-in consent before information can be gathered and shared. For example, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA)
essentially bans commercial websites directed at children under thirteen from collecting information directly from youths
without a parent or guardian’s verifiable knowledge and con327
sent. More recently, proposals for “Do Not Track” legislation
would limit Internet companies from collecting consumers’ webbrowsing data to instances where the consumer agreed to such
328
collection under an opt-in regime.

324. REGAN, supra note 39, at 76.
325. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (regulating federal government agencies’
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information).
326. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (agencies shall “maintain in its records only
such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President”). The Privacy Act was passed out of concern
over “the impact of computer data banks on individual privacy.” H.R. Rep. No.
93-1416, at 7 (1974).
327. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2000). As Anita Allen explains, under COPPA,
parents are “ascribed a powerful right to veto primary collection, primary use,
secondary use, and even maintenance of data.” ALLEN, supra note 92, at 178.
In response to COPPA, social network sites like Facebook only permit users
who are 13 and up; obtaining verifiable parental consent is both costly and
risky if entities learn that parental consent is not valid, as the Federal Trade
Commission has enforcement power over COPPA violations. Id. at 179–80
(discussing the FTC’s enforcement actions for COPPA violations). Nonetheless,
as social media scholar Danah Boyd and her colleagues have shown, parents
routinely assist young children in lying to social network sites like Facebook
so that their children can use those services, in some sense turning the purpose of the statute on its head. Danah Boyd et al., Why Parents Help Their
Children Lie to Facebook About Their Age: Unintended Consequences of the
‘Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act’, FIRST MONDAY, Nov. 7, 2011, http://
www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3850/3075.
328. In 2011, several “Do Not Track” bills were proposed that would protect
consumer information from being used without consent. Mark Hachman, Do
Not Track Legislation on the Move, PC MAG., May 6, 2011, http://www.pcmag
.com/article2/0,2817,2385045,00.asp.
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These past efforts by the Court and the political branches
to develop constraints on the deployment and use of data aggregation technologies provide useful models for accommodating Fourth Amendment interests implicated by technologies
like DAS. When considering the options, it is critical to highlight the fact that some data aggregation technologies cannot
adequately serve legitimate government interests if they can be
deployed only in the context of discrete investigations and with
the prior approval of a court. That is because systems like DAS
are designed for early detection and to create an archived rec329
ord of information that can be mined retrospectively. To serve
those purposes, these technologies need to be running all the
time. If law enforcement agencies were required to develop
probable cause before deploying a system like DAS, then these
critical interests would not be served. On the other hand, these
systems, by their very nature, engage in precisely the sort of
broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is characteristic of a
surveillance state, and therefore threaten reasonable expecta330
tions of quantitative privacy. Where, then, are we to strike a
reasonable balance between these competing interests?
Where data aggregation and mining technologies like DAS
are concerned, we suspect that the best way to accommodate
both law enforcement interests and interests in quantitative
privacy is through negotiated agreements akin to consent decrees. Consent decrees are a common tool used by parties to
cases challenging the constitutionality of law enforcement prac331
tices. For example, in Handschu v. Special Services Division,
the New York City Police Department entered into an agreement with civil rights advocates and labor organizations that
limited investigations of purely political activity and indiscriminate photography at political gatherings. The terms of the
agreement were enforced in the first instance by a special
commission of the NYPD, which then answered to the United

329. See Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million Super Computer System that Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License
Plate Readers and Crime Reports, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www
.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-unveils-new-40-million-super-computer
-system-data-network-cameras-license-plate-readers-crime-reports-article
-1.1132135 (reporting how DAS may be mined).
330. See Bill Keller, Living with the Surveillance State, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/opinion/keller-living-with-the
-surveillance-state.html (likening DAS to Orwell’s “Big Brother” of 1984).
331. 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
The terms of the Handschu consent decree, and its enforcement
structure, served a purpose similar to Odysseus’s decision to
bind himself to the mast of his ship so he could listen to the Sirens’ song without running the risk that he would steer himself
333
and his crew onto the Sirenum scopuli. The consent decree
allowed law enforcement to pursue legitimate criminal investigations that intersected with political activities within the
bounds of rule-ordered supervision designed to minimize the
risk that their investigations would indiscriminately infringe
First Amendment freedoms. A similar approach holds significant promise for protecting Fourth Amendment rights against
the indiscriminate use of data aggregation and mining technologies like DAS.
Once it is established that technologies like DAS implicate
reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy, it will be incumbent upon law enforcement agencies to coordinate with citizens and interest groups to develop regulatory frameworks
that strike a reasonable balance between competing inter334
ests.
In most cases, these agreements will feature limits on the
335
scope of data collection, retention, and use —what Jon Elster
336
might call “technological precommitments” —implemented
through design choices and administrative review structures.
332. Id. at 1389–90.
333. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 276–77 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books
1997). For more on the dynamics of precommitment and rationality, see JON
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36–47 (1979).
334. Although we do not endorse all of its recommendations, or necessarily
regard them as sufficient, the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee
designated by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in February 2003 to
offer recommendations on how data aggregation systems incorporated into the
defunct Total Awareness System might be deployed and used consistent with
rights to privacy provides an example of the sort of joint effort we have in
mind. See generally TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (2004).
335. See TAPAC, supra note 83, at 41‒42 (discussing the dangers associated with unlimited data retention and recommending government agencies and
their agents “clearly specif[y] the purposes of data mining, carefully evaluat[e]
the fitness and relevance of data for the intended purpose, leav[e] the data in
place whenever possible, and implement[] systems for updating or discarding
outdated information”).
336. We refer here to Jon Elster’s important work on reason, rationality,
and constitutional constraint. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000).

118

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:62

Both these negotiated arrangements and their application in
particular cases would, of course, be subject to court review for
Fourth Amendment sufficiency. Here again, experience can
help to guide us.
In at least some cases where law enforcement has deployed
data aggregation technologies, there have been some efforts to
effect restraints on collection, retention, and use of data. For
example, the FBI has for some time been using proprietary
software called EP2P that allows agents to identify the source
of images containing child pornography that are distributed
337
through peer-to-peer networks. Although the technology behind EP2P could be used to search all files lodged on a suspect’s
computer—or all files on all computers linked to a peer-to-peer
network—the software is designed such that agents can only
338
access folders that are designated as “shared.” New York officials report that images aggregated by DAS will be destroyed
after thirty days unless they are part of an active investiga339
tion. As another example, the company Palantir, which develops data analysis software for security and law enforcement
340
applications, incorporates use controls and audit logs into
their products that limit human access while providing a record
341
of who has queried a database, when, and why. By using meta-database management systems capable of searching across
many discrete “federated” databases, data can also be kept in
place rather than being aggregated into massive repositories,
thereby limiting both the scope of surveillance and the potential for abuse by inserting access and use controls both across
342
and between databases and search agents. We are not sug337. See United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1107‒08 (9th Cir. 2012)
(describing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “EP2P” software); United
States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 271‒72 (1st Cir. 2012) (differentiating the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s EP2P software from the commercially available program “LimeWire”); United States v. Gorski, 71 M.J. 729, 731‒33 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2012) (describing use of a “peer-to-peer” (P2P) network to
share and distribute files).
338. Budziak, 697 F.3d at 1108.
339. See Shane, supra note 320; see also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 41‒42
(recommending that data aggregation programs “implement[] systems for updating or discarding outdated information”).
340. What We Do, PALANTIR, http://www.palantir.com/what-we-do/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2013).
341. What We Believe, PALANTIR, http://www.palantir.com/what-we-believe/
#civilLiberties (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
342. See TAPAC, supra note 83, at 41 (recommending leaving the data in
place whenever possible); PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES INC., A CORE COMMITMENT: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 3 (2012) (describing feder-
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gesting that these efforts are necessary or sufficient to mark a
reasonable balance between the interests of law enforcement
and those of quantitative privacy, but, in our view, they signal
important steps in that direction and provide a useful set of examples and experiences that can help ground conversations
about the terms of deployment and use that should govern other data aggregation technologies.
By contrast, the data aggregation programs operated by
the FBI and NSA, which gather metadata for every telephonic
343
communication in the United States and aim to capture and
store the contents of all electronic communications in massive
344
servers housed in places like Camp Marshall in Utah, seem
dramatically overbroad and utterly disconnected from anything
345
beyond the most general and diffuse of government interests.
They are, in short, the very model of broad and indiscriminate
surveillance. As a consequence, the court orders issued against
companies like Verizon constitute a contemporary form of the
general warrants targeted by the Fourth Amendment at its in346
ception. Faced with public criticism, advocates for these surveillance programs have offered two major lines of defense.
First, proponents have argued that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) sanctions these programs and
that members of Congress have been briefed on a regular basis
347
without objecting. Of course, the raison d’être of constitutions
ated database architecture and how it can be used to enhance privacy protections).
343. See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 13-80 (F.I.S.C., Apr. 25, 2013) available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/government-documents
-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/ (ordering the
disclosure of “all call detail records or “telephony metadata” created by [Verizon] for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii)
wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.”).
344. See Bamford, The NSA is Building, supra note 6.
345. Given this massive and unreasonable disconnect, we are particularly
gratified to see a bi-partisan group of legislators organizing around an effort—
so far unsuccessful—to constrain NSA data gathering to targets who are actually suspected of wrongdoing. See Jonathan Weisman, Momentum Builds
Against N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2013, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/politics/momentum-builds-against-nsa
-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
346. See Otis, supra note 217. Not only are these FISA orders overbroad,
parallel revelations about the extensive use of independent contractors present us with a contemporary instance of the delegation powers that our founders regarded as odious features of writs of assistance and other general warrants.
347. Press Release, U.S. House of Representative Permanent Select Comm.
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is to set limits on what the political branches can do through
348
legislation or policy. In the shadow of their experiences with
writs of assistance and the Townshend Act, our late-eighteenth
century forebears adopted the Fourth Amendment as a bar on
legislative attempts to license general warrants or otherwise to
sanction policies of broad and indiscriminate search using the
349
political process. Thus, to the extent that the FISA licenses
new forms of general warrants and programs of broad and indiscriminate surveillance, it is unconstitutional and the review
350
and approval of some members of congress is irrelevant.
Second, defenders of these large-scale data aggregation
programs have argued that access to the resulting databases is
351
limited by internal agency rules and policies. A redacted deon Intelligence, Joint Statement by House Intelligence Chairman Mike Rogers
and Ranking Member C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger (June 6, 2013), available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/press-release/joint-statement-house
-intelligence-chairman-mike-rogers-and-ranking-member-ca-dutch (“The collection described with yesterday’s disclosure of a purported court order is consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) as passed by
Congress, executed by the Executive Branch, and approved by a Federal Court
. . . . When these authorities are used, they are governed by court-approved
processes and procedures. Moreover, the use of these authorities is reviewed
and approved by federal judges every 90 days. Additionally, the Committee
routinely reviews all FISA activities.”). Their assertions have since been
backed up by the declassification of agency letters sent by the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legislative Affairs to members of Congress. See Letter from
Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sivestre
Reyes, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of
Representatives (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/
g/page/politics/government-documents-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone
-metadata-records/351/; Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Diane Feinstein, Chairman, & Saxby Chambliss, Vice
Chairman, Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. Senate (Feb. 2, 2011), available
at
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/government-documents
-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/.
348. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 36‒47 (1979); David Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should Be a
Constitutional Comparativist . . . Sometimes, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1266
(2007); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role
of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40‒41
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
349. Davies, supra note 42, at 578‒81, 657‒60, 663‒64, 668 (“[The framers]
thought the important issue, and the only potential threat to the right to be
secure, was whether general warrants could be authorized by legislation.”).
350. It would also cut against the grain of FISA itself, which was passed to
constrain the NSA’s demonstrated tendency to pursue ever more expansive
surveillance.
351. Jeffrey Rosen, Control Your Spooks, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15, 2013, at
22 (describing James Clapper’s claims that rules attached to the original data
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scription of these minimization procedures contained in a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) order was declassified by the NSA in advance of congressional hearings on July
352
31, 2013. Although much is still unknown, we see both promise and disappointment in these procedures as they have so far
been described. Let us first consider the good.
There are, broadly, three issues at stake when evaluating
the deployment and use of data aggregation technologies: collection, access, and retention. As described, the minimization
procedures do constrain access and also set limits on retention.
According to the order, all metadata that is collected must be
353
housed in “secure networks under NSA’s control.” Only “authorized personnel who have received appropriate and ade354
quate training” have access, and they are limited to conducting manual or automated “chain[ed] queries” using “seed”
terms approved in advance by a select group of senior intelli355
gence officials or the FISC. Users are also subject to authen356
tication and their queries audited. Senior intelligence and
Department of Justice officials are required to meet and review
compliance with these procedures and to report their findings
357
to the FISC on a regular basis. Finally, the order provides
that all metadata that is collected will be destroyed no later
358
than five years after collection. Many of these constraints on
access and retention no doubt hold promise as executives, legislatures, and courts strive to effect the reasonable balance between law enforcement interests and citizen privacy demanded
by the Fourth Amendment. Many questions remain, of course,
among them details about what constitutes “appropriate and
adequate training,” auditing procedures, and court oversight.
Now, let us consider the bad. The most significant problem
aggregation warrants issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in
support of these programs set limits on access).
352. See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 13-80 (F.I.S.C., Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/government-documents
-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/.
353. Id. at 4.
354. Id. at 5. The Order provides an exception to this rule for “technical
personnel responsible for NSA’s underlying corporate infrastructure and the
transmission of the BR metadata from the specified persons to NSA . . . .” Id.
at 5 n.3.
355. Id. at 6‒11.
356. Id. at 12‒14.
357. Id. at 15‒18.
358. Id. at 14.
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with the data aggregation programs described in these leaked
documents is the indiscriminate breadth of collection. No matter how strict, access rules and limits on retention simply cannot render “reasonable” data collection programs that are fatally broad and indiscriminate. These programs clearly cross that
threshold. It is impossible to imagine that any but the smallest
mote of data gathered is relevant to anti-terrorism efforts. In
359
fact, senior government officials have admitted as much. Furthermore, the vast majority of cases cited by supporters of the
programs’ success seem to involve queries based on evidence
360
gathered through traditional law enforcement means. In these circumstances, more narrowly tailored, case specific, data
gathering would have done just as well, and certainly would
have reflected a more reasonable balance between law en361
forcement interests and citizen privacy. Also important is the
fact that none of these procedures has been subject to the crucible of adversarial challenge. That is because the NSA has
kept the programs secret while simultaneously arguing that
nobody has standing to bring a challenge unless they can prove
that they have been monitored, which is impossible because the
362
program is kept secret. We therefore do not know, and cannot
359. Robert Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Remarks at the Newseum Special Program: NSA Surveillance Leaks: Facts and
Fiction (June 26, 2013) (transcript on file with authors) (“Each determination
of a reasonable suspicion under this program must be documented and approved, and only a small portion of the data that is collected is ever actually
reviewed, because the vast majority of that data is never going to be responsive to one of these terrorism-related queries.”).
360. See id. (“The metadata that is acquired and kept under this program
can only be queried when there is reasonable suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts, that a particular telephone number is associated with specified
foreign terrorist organizations.”).
361. See Charlie Savage, Surveillance Programs Defended as Officials Cite
Thwarted Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013, at A18 (“Representative Adam
B. Schiff, Democrat of California, pressed General Alexander to explain why
the F.B.I. could not simply get the relevant logs of calls linked to a suspicious
number without keeping a database of all domestic calls. General Alexander
said he was open to discussing doing it that way, but added, ‘[t]he concern is
speed in crisis.’”).
362. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). An action filed by
the ACLU challenging the NSA’s gathering of telephonic metadata appears to
have cleared this hurdle, but was only able to do so because an NSA contractor
leaked top-secret documents. See Complaint at 6, Am. Civil Liberties Union v.
Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 11, 2013), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/assets/nsa_phone_spying_complaint.pdf. The Electronic
Privacy Information Center and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have since
filed actions challenging the NSA’s massive data gathering on statutory and
First Amendment grounds. See In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., No. 13 (petition
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really evaluate, the adequacy of these measures to the task of
363
constraining law enforcement discretion. It is hard to imagine
that those who read and wrote the text of the Fourth Amendment would have thought that it allowed the government not
only to conduct searches pursuant to general warrants, but to
do so in secret. Thus, there is simply no other way to view these
programs than as constitutionally unreasonable; and the authority granted to them by the FISC as general warrants.
* * *
Although this Article is the first to advance a coherent,
doctrinally grounded proposal for regulating general surveillance and data aggregation technologies like DAS, there is good
reason to think that law enforcement agencies will be receptive.
The NYPD has committed itself to some checks on information
retention and sharing coordinated by DAS—including the thirty-day retention policy mentioned above—in its “Public Securi364
ty Privacy Guidelines.” The policy sets limits on how long certain data will be stored and pledges to share information only
with private “stakeholders” who have signed memoranda of
365
understanding. It further claims that “[d]igital watermarking
or an equivalent technique will be used to create an immutable
366
audit log of where and when data is accessed.” Linking these
technological pre-commitments to supervising administrative
bodies—such as the special commission designated in
Handschu—that are empowered to monitor use and to impose
civil and administrative penalties in cases of abuse would provide further assurances that programs like DAS are serving legitimate law enforcement interests while still protecting rea367
sonable expectations in quantitative privacy.
Courts must
for cert. filed July 8, 2013), available at https://epic.org/EPIC-FISC-Mandamus
-Petition.pdf (challenging the program on statutory grounds); Complaint at 13,
First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. CV 13-3287
(N.D.C.A., filed July 16, 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/file/37386#
page/28/mode/2up (challenging the program on First Amendment grounds).
363. Cf. Davies, supra note 42, at 556, 578‒81, 655‒57 (arguing that the
founders’ primary concern when adopting the Fourth Amendment was to limit
the licensing of unconstrained discretion, specifically through the use of general warrants).
364. Public Security Privacy Guidelines, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, (Apr. 2,
2009), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_
security_privacy_guidelines.pdf.
365. Id.at 2.
366. Id. at 7.
367. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1402
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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retain final authority to review the decisions and conduct of
any such administrative panels, of course; but active, responsive, and thoughtful internal review procedures will make court
intervention less necessary and therefore less frequent. The
NSA, FBI, and other federal agencies involved in collecting telephonic metadata have also instituted controls. Although they
are inadequate given the sheer breadth and scale of the data
that is being collected, they might well render constitutional a
more targeted program. For the present, however, we are
heartened by the effort, which we see as an important positive
signal in the context of ongoing efforts to understand and accommodate Fourth Amendment protections of quantitative privacy.
D. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND HUMAN
SURVEILLANCE
There is a heated debate after Jones over the implications
of quantitative privacy for many traditional law enforcement
methods. For example, Orin Kerr has wondered whether “visu368
al surveillance [should] be subject to [mosaic analysis].” Justice Scalia expressed similar concerns in his majority opinion in
369
Jones. Adding weight to their fears, Christopher Slobogin, a
mosaic theory advocate, has argued that human surveillance
should be subject to the same Fourth Amendment regulations
370
as GPS-enabled tracking.
Our technology-centered approach would not implicate
human surveillance and other traditional investigative techniques. As Justice Alito observed in Jones, “[human] surveillance for any extended period of time [is] difficult and costly
371
and therefore rarely undertaken.” Because human surveillance is incapable of sustaining the sort of broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is characteristic of a surveillance state,
it would not be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation under
372
our technology-centered approach.
This result would not
368. Kerr, supra note 33, at 335.
369. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 953‒54 (2012).
370. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical
Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J.
727, 757 (1993).
371. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
372. This marks a significant point of departure between us and most other
contributors to the post-Jones debate, including Christopher Slobogin. See,
e.g., Slobogin, supra note 53, at 25 (proposing legislative limitations on human
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change even if law enforcement assembled a detailed mosaic
documenting the activities of an individual suspect using mul373
tiple traditional law enforcement methods.
Why? Because
these mosaics, by virtue of how they are assembled, simply do
not raise the specter of a surveillance state, and therefore do
not trigger Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative priva374
cy.
* * *
Although necessarily brief, the foregoing provides a general
account of how a technology-centered approach to quantitative
privacy would work in practice, and how it would apply to different kinds of surveillance technologies and methods, including drones, GPS-enabled tracking, DAS, the NSA’s telephonic
and electronic surveillance program, and human surveillance.
This goes part way to answering the demands of skeptics on
and off the Court for a workable approach to Fourth Amend375
ment cases after Jones. We continue the journey in Part IV
by explaining how our technology-centered approach answers
or moots many of the most persistent objections that have been
raised by quantitative privacy skeptics.
IV. SOME CONCERNS ABOUT QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY
IN PRACTICE
Proposals to extend Fourth Amendment protections to cover reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy have been
376
met with considerable resistance. This Part addresses some
377
of the most salient criticisms. As our discussion shows, these
challenges mainly target the “mosaic” theory of quantitative
privacy. Among the many advantages of our technologycentered approach is that it avoids many of these concerns.
surveillance conducted for periods longer than twenty minutes).
373. Thus, our technology-based approach also answers Orin Kerr’s concerns about how quantitative privacy would apply to bodies of information aggregated by different law enforcement groups or agencies. See Kerr, supra note
33, at 347.
374. We are in debt to James Grimmelmann for pressing us to clarity on
this point.
375. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953‒54; Kerr, supra note 33, at 343‒50.
We discuss how our technology-centered approach would provide a clear road
forward on the facts of Jones below. See infra notes 410–29 and accompanying
text.
376. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953‒54; Kerr, supra note 33, at 343‒50.
377. For an extended analysis of objections to the mosaic theory, see Gray
& Citron, supra note 53, at 398‒11.
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A. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH RESOLVES
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES
Critics contend that recognizing a quantitative dimension
to Fourth Amendment privacy creates thorny practical chal378
lenges. Among the most nettlesome is drawing lines between
quanta of information that implicate reasonable expectations of
379
privacy and those that do not.
Justice Scalia levels this
charge in Jones, pointing out that Justice Alito’s concurring
opinion does not explain why short-term monitoring is accepta380
ble but “a 4-week investigation is ‘surely’ too long.” Orin Kerr
381
has echoed Justice Scalia’s concerns. Kerr has also expressed
reservations about how to parse mosaics that are aggregated
382
using a variety of techniques and technologies.
Although these line-drawing challenges may have some
383
traction against a mosaic theory of quantitative privacy, they
have no bite at all against our technology-centered proposal.
Whereas a case-by-case approach to quantitative privacy requires courts to evaluate the Fourth Amendment interests implicated by individual mosaics, a technology-centered approach
interrogates the potential for abuse inherent in a given surveillance technology. As new surveillance technologies become
available, courts will need to determine whether those technologies have the capacity to facilitate the sorts of broad programs
of indiscriminate surveillance that raise constitutional concerns
about a surveillance state. If a particular technology does not
raise these concerns, then the Fourth Amendment simply does
not apply. If it does, then the government will only be allowed
to use that technology when it can meet the demands of Fourth
378. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 953-54; Kerr, supra note 33, at 343‒50.
379. See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 6, 17.
380. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. We discuss Knotts at greater depth below. See
infra notes 410–29 and accompanying text.
381. Kerr, supra note 33, at 333 (“[H]ow long must the tool be used before
the relevant mosaic is created?”).
382. Id. at 335‒36.
383. Of course, worries about line drawing are by no means unique to
quantitative privacy. The Fourth Amendment’s center of gravity is reasonableness. See Akhil Amar, Terry and the Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1998). Assessments of reasonableness are inherently prone to spectrums and nuances, and seldom are amenable to bright
line rules and dramatic contrasts. Despite these difficulties, the Court has yet
to abandon a constitutional protection simply because it is challenging to enforce. Rather, the Court leaves it to the lower courts to mush through the
“factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383
(2007).
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384

Amendment reasonableness. To be sure, assessments of reasonableness—by balancing the interests of law enforcement
and citizens—present their own challenges; but they are both
385
familiar and inherent to Fourth Amendment itself. They are
also downstream struggles. Under our approach, the upstream
question of whether use of a technology constitutes a search at
all is answered as a general matter for that technology rather
386
than on a case-by-case basis.
The results of an upstream search inquiry should not
change merely because a surveillance technology is commonplace. In holding that thermal detection technology should be
subject to Fourth Amendment regulation in Kyllo v. United
States, Justice Scalia contemplated the possibility that the result in that case might have been different if that technology
387
was in “general public use.” The implication is that, if a technology is in general public use, then it is unreasonable, as a descriptive matter, for anyone to expect that they are not being
observed with that technology by fellow citizens, and therefore
also unreasonable, as a normative matter, to expect that law
enforcement officers should be constrained by the Fourth
388
Amendment. This is technological determinism run amok. As
Justice Scalia argued in Kyllo, “the power of technology to
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy” must be limited lest we
“permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by
389
the Fourth Amendment.” The alternative is to require that
citizens “retir[e] to the cellar, cloaking all the windows with
thick caulking, turning off the lights and remaining absolutely
390
quiet.” When faced with this alternative, “we must ask what
we will have saved if we cede significant ground to a bunker
mode of existence, retaining only that sliver of privacy that we
384. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
385. See id. at 354.
386. For the same reason, our technology-centered approach avoids problems relating to human-collected surveillance mosaics collected via multiple
investigative tools and methods. For reasons described above, human surveillance is not a technology that implicates quantitative privacy. See supra notes
369–74.
387. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
388. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at
the expense of privacy . . . .”).
389. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see also Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 384
(“Fortunately, neither Katz nor the fourth amendment asks what we expect of
government. They tell us what we should demand of government.”).
390. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 402.
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391

cannot envision a madman exploiting.” To paraphrase one
learned member of the bench, we “simply cannot imagine that
the drafters of the Fourth Amendment dictated such dark and
392
cloistered lives for citizens.”
Our technology-centered approach also helps to clarify or
resolve other practical challenges leveled against quantitative
privacy. For example, in Jones, Justice Alito argues that, “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses im393
pinges on expectations of privacy.” This suggests that whether an investigative technology constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search relates in part to the seriousness of the crime under investigation. As Justice Scalia rightly points out for the majority, “[t]here is no precedent for the proposition that whether a
search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being
394
investigated.”
As our technology-centered approach makes
clear, however, there is simply no argumentative clash here.
Justice Scalia is surely right that the nature of the offense
being investigated has no relevance to the upstream question of
whether law enforcement conduct constitutes a “search.” Citizens do not possess greater expectations of privacy in less seri395
ous crimes. The seriousness of an offense is, however, highly
relevant to the downstream question of whether a search is
396
“reasonable.” As we pointed out in Part III, assessing Fourth
Amendment reasonableness is a matter of balancing citizen interests with those of law enforcement. Law enforcement naturally has a weightier interest in detecting and prosecuting more
397
serious crimes than it does for minor offenses. When weigh391. Hutchins, supra note 135, at 464.
392. Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 97 (2d Cir. 2004) (Straub, J., dissenting); see also Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 402 (“This much withdrawal is
not required in order to claim the benefit of the amendment because, if it were,
the amendment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the kind of open society to which we are committed and in which the amendment is supposed to
function”); Crocker, supra note 204, at 369 (“[P]lacing pressure on persons to
return to their individual ‘private’ worlds to seek refuge from government
searches and surveillance diminishes the public sphere’s security.”).
393. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
394. Id. at 954.
395. Id.
396. Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4
(2011) (“A key intuitive component of reasonableness is the seriousness of the
crime investigated.”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a)‒(s) (2012) (limiting use of wiretapping technology to investigations of enumerated offenses).
397. See Bellin, supra note 396, at 9 (“The public’s interest in any search or
seizure surely depends to some degree on the seriousness of the crime under
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ing the reasonableness of a search, the seriousness of the of398
fense being investigated is therefore relevant.
Likewise,
courts can, and should, consider the seriousness of the offense
being investigated as a factor when determining whether law
enforcement officers acted reasonably during a search or sei399
zure. Thus, a court would be far more likely to grant a warrant for GPS-enabled tracking for a month if probable cause exists to believe both that the target is directing a large drug
conspiracy and that the tracking will produce additional important evidence, as was in fact the case in Jones, but less likely to grant a similar warrant for a person suspected of perpetrating occasional minor speeding offenses.
Critics might grant us these points, but argue that our
technology-centered approach comes with its own baggage. For
example, a skeptic might argue that focusing on the technology
400
begets its own line-drawing problems.
Specifically, they
investigation.”); Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public
Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1598 (2010) (reporting that public opinion polls rate investigations of serious crimes as less
intrusive than investigations of minor crimes); William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 870, 875 (2001) (“A large factor in government
need—perhaps the largest—is the crime the government is investigating . . .
the worst crimes are the most important ones to solve, the ones worth paying
the largest price in intrusions on citizens’ liberty and privacy.”).
398. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (“The logic of distinguishing between minor
and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of school searches is almost too clear for argument.”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984)
(“Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless
arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor.”);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain
a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought
to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach
it.”); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984) (“But maybe in
dealing with so intrusive a technique as television surveillance, other methods
of control as well, such as banning the technique outright from use in the
home in connection with minor crimes, will be required, in order to strike a
proper balance between public safety and personal privacy.”); Christopher
Slobogin, The World Without the Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1,
68‒75 (1991).
399. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“A police officer may
not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”); Cipes v.
Graham, 386 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing the fact that plaintiff
was only suspected of a misdemeanor offense as relevant to determining
whether a nighttime raid of his house was “reasonable”).
400. We are in debt to Richard Myers and others who have pressed us on
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might argue that DAS and drones represent easy examples of
technologies that raise quantitative privacy concerns, but that
courts inevitably will confront technologies whose Fourth
Amendment status is not as clear. These are not new problems
401
for Fourth Amendment law, of course. To the contrary, they
are endemic to the reasonableness inquiry that lies at the heart
402
of contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine. We therefore
accept the inevitability of close cases. In doing so, however, we
emphasize that the systemic burden of close cases will be much
lighter under a technology-centered approach than they would
be under a mosaic theory. That is because, whether it is a close
call or not, once the Fourth Amendment status of a technology
has been established, the threshold question of whether use of
that technology constitutes a Fourth Amendment search does
not need to be litigated in every case where the technology is
used. By contrast, under a mosaic approach, whether a particular aggregation of information constitutes a search is a question
that must be litigated de novo in every case because, like snow403
flakes, every mosaic will necessarily be unique. We are also
confident that the factors for evaluating the surveillance threat
posed by a particular technology, such as scale, scope, and cost,
are likely to be fewer and easier to apply with greater predictability than the many variables that would inform a mosaic
analysis, where the idiosyncratic dispositions of judges likely
404
would hold more than the usual sway.
Critics of our technology-centered approach might also argue that law enforcement officers and agencies acting in their
strategic modes will simply avoid Fourth Amendment regulation by making minor changes to regulated surveillance tech405
nologies in an ongoing game of “technological whack-a-mole.”
Here again, these sorts of strategic games are not without precedent. For example, the advent of designer drugs has allowed
this point.
401. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474‒75 (1971)
(finding no surprise and little weight in “the unstated proposition that when a
line is drawn there is often not a great deal of difference between situations
closest to it on either side”).
402. Id.
403. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953‒54 (2012); Kerr,
supra note 33, at 343‒50.
404. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); see also Freiwald,
supra note 41, at 5.
405. We owe this wonderful turn of phrase to Max Mishkin of Yale’s Information Society Project.

2013]

QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY

131

manufacturers to simply change the chemical formulation of
their products to avoid criminal liability—at least until the law
406
407
catches up. Similar games are played in the patent world.
The solution in these contexts is often to focus on function ra408
ther than precise chemical structure. That same approach
holds considerable promise in the present context to block attempts by law enforcement circumnavigate Fourth Amendment
409
regulations.
This discussion does not exhaust all of the practical challenges that proposals to defend reasonable interests in quantitative privacy must face. It nevertheless provides good grounds
for believing that they can be met, and that our technologycentered approach offers a far better alternative than proposals
for case-by-case methods based on the mosaic theory.
B. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND THE PUBLIC
OBSERVATION DOCTRINE
Another potential bar to judicial recognition of quantitative
privacy is stare decisis and particularly United States v.
410
Knotts. In Knotts, the Court held that using a beeper device
to track a suspect’s car on public streets did not constitute a
“search” because the suspect lacked a reasonable expectation of
411
privacy in his public movements. The parallel between Knotts
and Jones is obvious. In both cases, law enforcement officers
412
used a passive signaling device attached to a car. In both cas-

406. See generally Bertha K. Madras, Designer Drugs: An Escalating Public
Health Challenge, 206 J. GLOBAL DRUG POL’Y & PRAC. 1 (2012), available at
http://www.dfaf.org/webinar/files/designer_drugs.pdf.
407. Cf. Citron & Pasqual, supra note 22, at 1486 (exploring how fusion
centers can engage in regulatory arbitrage by moving data mining to a jurisdiction with less restrictive privacy laws); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 223, 238 (2004) (discussing shifting of activity to jurisdictions
with less regulatory restriction).
408. See generally Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Inc., 339
U.S. 605, 607‒08 (1950).
409. This is precisely the approach adopted by Switzerland in revisions to
its privacy laws. See Susan Freiwald & Sylvain Métille, Reforming Surveillance Law: The Swiss Model, B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2013) (on
file with authors) (describing how Swiss privacy laws are designed to accommodate changes in technology without requiring constant amendment to the
codes themselves).
410. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
411. Id. at 281.
412. Id. at 278; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
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es, the devices revealed only movements on public streets. In
414
both cases, those movements were exposed to public view.
Given these parallels, Knotts would seem to control in cases
like Jones, thus barring Fourth Amendment review of GPSenabled tracking, drones, or data aggregation systems, so long
as the technology is only used to monitor movements in pub415
lic. Should the Court eventually adopt the views expressed by
the Jones concurrences, it therefore seems obliged to overrule
Knotts.
Our technology-centered approach avoids this entanglement with stare decisis by providing easy grounds for distinguishing Knotts from cases that involve GPS-enabled tracking
416
or other advanced surveillance technology like aerial drones.
The beeper technology used in Knotts was simply incapable of
broad and indiscriminate surveillance. It could only provide di417
rectional information, not a suspect’s precise location. To be
of any use at all, the beepers used in Knotts needed to be in
418
close proximity to a dedicated radio receiver. Because no stable network of these receivers existed, officers had to follow the
419
beepers, and hence the suspects, to track them. This beeper
technology was thus little more than an adjunct to traditional
human surveillance and therefore labored under the same
420
practical limitations. That is why the Knotts Court ultimately
held that the beeper technology used in that case “raise[d] no
constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also
421
raise.”
The GPS-enabled tracking technology used in Jones and
other technologies that threaten quantitative privacy are mate422
rially different. They therefore implicate markedly “different
413. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
414. Id.
415. It would have to be public movements. See United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 713‒14 (1984).
416. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
417. With a stable network of receivers, officers might have been able to
triangulate Knotts’s position. Cellular phone providers presently can locate
subscribers’ phones using this same technique. See Susan Freiwald, Cell
Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not
Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 683 (2011).
418. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
419. Id.
420. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 n.10 (Alito, J., concurring).
421. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
422. See Hutchins, supra note 135, at 414–21.
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423

constitutional principles.” GPS-enabled technology provides
second-by-second location data. Like drones, GPS is precise,
424
highly scalable, and increasingly inexpensive.
Due to the
nearly ubiquitous reach of satellite networks, GPS technology
has extensive range and can locate devices within a range of
425
several feet. Unlike the beeper technology in Knotts, GPSenabled tracking devices gather locational data without any
426
need for human beings to “tail” targets. Officers can monitor
the movements of a GPS-enabled device from anywhere at any
time or automate their work by allowing a computer to do the
427
monitoring for them. GPS networks can also cheaply track
millions of devices, and algorithms can search unlimited hours
428
of locational data for significant patterns. Thus, granting law
enforcement unfettered access to GPS-enabled tracking tech429
nology raises the specter of a surveillance state. The constitutional distinction between Knotts and Jones is therefore not
that officers exercised restraint in their use of technology in
Knotts, but, rather, that the technology used in Knotts came
with inherent constraints that limited its ability to facilitate
broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance. The GPS technology used in Jones suffers no such limitations.
C. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND THE STATE
AGENCY REQUIREMENT
In her concurring opinion in Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggests that recognizing a constitutional dimension to quantitative privacy might require “reconsider[ing] the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in infor423. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
424. Farhad Manjoo, Keeping Loved Ones on the Grid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2012, at D1.
425. See Hutchins, supra note 135, at 418–20.
426. Michael Ferraresi, GPS Makes Police Officers’ Job Easier, Safer, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/community/scottsdale/
articles/1007sr-technology07Z8.html.
427. Carrie Johnson and Steve Inskeep, GPS Devices Do the Work of Law
Enforcement, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=130851849.
428. See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 2; Erik Eckholm, Private Snoops Find
GPS Trail Legal to Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, at A1 (reporting that
sales of GPS-enabled tracking devices surpass 100,000 a year and are rising);
Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, WASH. POST, Aug.
13, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/
article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html?nav=rss_metro/va.
429. Hutchins, supra note 135, at 421.
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430

mation voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” Her concern
seems to be that substantive Fourth Amendment interests
threatened by broad and indiscriminate surveillance are no less
at stake when information is gathered through private actors
than when it is gathered or aggregated by the government di431
rectly. To the extent that she is right, it would appear that
private data collections assembled by service providers, such as
Verizon, or data brokers, like Acxiom, provide a wide avenue by
which the government could circumnavigate efforts to protect
Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy. Although
compelling, we doubt that dramatic doctrinal changes are necessary to meet Justice Sotomayor’s concerns. To explain why,
let us first briefly elaborate two lines of Fourth Amendment
doctrine that intersect with Justice Sotomayor’s concerns: the
state action requirement and the third-party doctrine.
The Information Privacy Law Project has long been concerned with privacy violations that citizens perpetrate against
each other in their private roles. From the start, it has relied
on, and responded to, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s
seminal 1890 article, which focused on violations of “the right
432
‘to be let alone’” perpetrated by the press to satisfy the “pru433
rient taste[s]” of its readership. In that spirit, scholars have
drawn attention to the privacy implications of developing tech434
nology when wielded by private entities. Various efforts have
430. Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Crocker, supra note 204 (arguing for a modification of the
third-party doctrine).
431. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.
432. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
433. Id. at 194–96. (“When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and
crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community, what
wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance.
Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human nature which is
never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no
one can be surprised that it usurps the place of interest in brains capable of
other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of
feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under
its blighting influence.”). Although credit is due to Alan Westin for creating
the field of information privacy law, we regard Warren and Brandeis’s seminal
1890 article as the first contribution to what has since come to be the Information Privacy Law Project. See Danielle Citron, In Honor of Alan Westin:
Privacy Trailblazer, Seer, and Changemaker, CONCURRING OPS. (Feb. 24,
2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/in-honor-of-alan
-westin-privacy-trailblazer-seer-and-changemaker.html.
434. See, e.g., SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 87, at 5–15.
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also been made to develop legislative and common law protec435
tions. No matter how intrusive, however, these private infringements are beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment.
That is because, as the Court has long held, “the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbi436
trary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative.”
An important consequence of this state agency requirement is that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated if the
fruits of a private search are passed along to government
437
agents. That result does not change if the private search is
438
unlawful. The state agency requirement therefore appears to
have serious consequences for efforts to secure Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy. Faced with Fourth
Amendment constraints, law enforcement might simply contract with a private drone operator or private data aggregator
to benefit indirectly from technology that it cannot use direct439
ly. Fortunately, existing doctrine closes this loophole.
The Fourth Amendment is implicated not only when government employees engage directly in a search, but also when a
private party acts as an “agent or instrument of the
440
[g]overnment.”
Whether a private party is considered an
agent of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes
“turns on the degree of the Government’s participation in the
441
private party’s activities.” This is “a question that can only be
442
resolved in light of all the circumstances.”
That the
“[g]overnment has not compelled a private party to perform a
search does not, by itself, establish that the search is a private
443
one.” For a private party to be considered a state actor, the
government does not need to be “the moving force of the
435. Among these is the American Law Institute’s recent commitment to
draft a Restatement of Information Privacy Principles under the leadership of
Paul Schwartz and Dan Solove as the Reporters. One of us (Citron) is part of
the small group of scholars, judges, advocates, and industry leaders who will
be helping to draft them.
436. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
437. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
438. Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475.
439. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Centers Tap Into Private Databases, WASH.
POST, Apr. 2, 2008, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-02/news/
36868484_1_fusion-centers-databases-credit-reports.
440. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614–15.
441. Id. (citations omitted).
442. Id. at 614–15 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
443. Id. at 615.
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444

search.” The private search does not even need to be done for
445
the purpose of advancing a law enforcement purpose. All that
is necessary is some “clear indic[ation] of the Government’s en446
couragement, endorsement, and participation.” This threshold will usually be met where a private entity is directed or incentivized by the government, where the private entity
reasonably believes that it is acting on state authority or direction, or where a government agent knows or has reason to
447
know that the private entity is acting to advance state goals.
The direct participation of a government official in an other448
wise private search would certainly be enough. A contractual
relationship or specific statutory authorization would also suffice if it demonstrated a governmental “desire to share the
449
fruits” of a private search.
We suspect that, in most cases where the government’s
benefitting from private surveillance or leveraging private data
reservoirs would raise the specter of a surveillance state, there
will also be sufficient evidence of government encouragement,
sponsorship, or participation to bring the private entity’s activities under Fourth Amendment review. DAS, a joint Microsoft
and NYPD project, is illustrative. The NYPD could not avoid
Fourth Amendment regulation of DAS by simply outsourcing
DAS and its operation to a private contractor because that con450
tractor would be acting as an agent of the NYPD. The result
would not be different if DAS was developed and deployed by a
private company which then sold its services to the NYPD. To
be of much benefit, the technology would need access to infor451
mation controlled by the government. The private company
would also depend, in part or in whole, on income from gov452
ernment sources. At the least, government would have an
444. Cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949).
445. Cf. id.
446. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615–16.
447. Id.
448. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
449. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615–16.
450. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 72, 82 (2001).
451. We might say the same about Google’s involvement in building Virtual
Alabama for Alabama’s Department of Homeland Security. See McKenna, supra note 21. Under its license for the technology, Alabama can add data from
all available sources. Virtual Alabama is also encouraging contributions from
private entities in exchange for access to the system. If Google operated Virtual Alabama and provided analysis to Alabama’s DHS, then Google should
surely be considered a state agent with respect to those activities.
452. TORIN MONAHAN, SURVEILLANCE IN THE TIME OF INSECURITY 47
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abiding interest in the data, manifested by repeated requests
for information. These facts would certainly be sufficient to
show state agency. By contrast, if no such facts existed, then
453
there would be no specter of a surveillance state. On this account, Verizon and other telecommunication companies that
have been subject to FISA orders demanding the production of
metadata for all domestic and international telephone communications on a rolling and continuous basis for many years running are acting as state agents—though perhaps unwilling—
when they collect and aggregate that data for the NSA and
454
FBI.
D. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND THE THIRDPARTY DOCTRINE
In addition to end-runs around the Fourth Amendment via
the state-agency requirement, Justice Sotomayor’s concerns in
Jones implicate the third-party doctrine, which holds that the
Fourth Amendment is not violated if the government obtains
information from a third party that an investigative target vol455
untarily shared with that third party. Applying this doctrine,
the Court has held that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if a bank shares customers’ financial records with law en-

(2010) (describing trade shows devoted to private security contractors selling
their wares to government agencies).
453. Following Warren and Brandeis, we might nevertheless like to set
limits on what these purely private entities do, but that would be a task for
the political branches or the common law of torts, not the Fourth Amendment.
454. Cf. Ted Ullyot, Facebook Releases Data, Including all National Security Requests, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 14, 2013), http://newsroom.fb.com/
News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-Requests
(“For the six months ending December 31, 2012, the total number of user-data
requests Facebook received from any and all government entities in the U.S.
(including local, state, and federal, and including criminal and national security-related requests)—was between 9,000 and 10,000. These requests run the
gamut—from things like a local sheriff trying to find a missing child, to a federal marshal tracking a fugitive, to a police department investigating an assault, to a national security official investigating a terrorist threat. The total
number of Facebook user accounts for which data was requested pursuant to
the entirety of those 9–10 thousand requests was between 18,000 and 19,000
accounts.”). The same may well be true of companies such as Facebook,
Google, and Apple who are ordered to participate in the NSA’s Prism program.
Because the details of this program, including the technology used, the scope
of aggregation, and the level of government access, have so far remained secret, it is at this point premature to even speculate.
455. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
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456

forcement,
or if a telephone company discloses records of
457
phone calls customers have made or received. Although the
Court has not been entirely clear on the underlying justification for the third-party doctrine, the most coherent is that a
person “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Govern458
ment” by lawful means. As the Court has pointed out, that
risk does not diminish “even if the information is revealed [to
the third party] on the assumption that it will be used only for
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
459
will not be betrayed.”
Law enforcement investigations frequently employ cooperating witnesses, confidential informants, and even undercover
460
police officers. No matter how surprised or dismayed the target of such investigative strategies may be, the third-party doc456. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43; see also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 69 (1974) (holding that statute requiring banks to keep copies of customers’ checks does not implicate the Fourth Amendment). Congress responded to Miller and Schultz by passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22, which provides bank customers some privacy regarding
their records held by banks and other financial institutions and stipulates procedures whereby federal agencies can gain access to those records.
457. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (explaining that a person
who uses the phone “assume[s] the risk that the [telephone] company would
reveal to police the numbers he dialed”). See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra
note 87, at 205. (“The Pen Register Act attempt[ed] to fill the void left by
Smith v. Maryland by requiring a court order to use a pen register or trap and
trace device. Whereas a pen register records the [tele]phone numbers a person
dials from [a] home, a trap and trace device creates a list of the telephone
numbers of incoming calls.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2006).
458. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
751–52 (1971)). In Miller and other cases in the line, the Court has also suggested that citizens retain no reasonable expectation of privacy at all in information shared with third parties. See Smith 442 U.S. at 743‒44 (“This Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”); Miller, 425 U.S. at
442. This seems to be how Justice Sotomayor reads the rule as well. See Jones
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (describing the third-party doctrine as “the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”). This, of course, is
far too broad, and if taken at face value would mean that Katz itself was
wrongly decided insofar as the words intercepted by the government’s “electronic ear” in that case had been voluntarily shared by Katz with a third-party
conversant. We therefore assume that the third-party doctrine relies on some
version of the narrower misplaced trust rationale.
459. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
460. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (undercover
agents); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (confidential informant);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (cooperating witness).

2013]

QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY

139

trine holds that he simply has no Fourth Amendment complaint if those with whom he shared information in confidence
decide to violate that trust, whether voluntarily, under force of
461
subpoena, or by threat of contempt. In the age of data aggregation, the stakes for privacy implicated by this third-party
462
doctrine have grown dramatically. Vast reservoirs of our private data are gathered by or otherwise reside in the hands of
463
private entities. GPS chips in telephones, cars, or computers
share a steady stream of information about our movements
with companies that provide services associated with these de464
vices.
Internet Service Providers and search engines log
465
where we go and what we do online. Credit card companies
466
and other vendors record and analyze our shopping habits. In
all of these cases, the information is freely shared with a person
467
or entity so they can provide a service or convenience. Under
the third-party doctrine, we have no Fourth Amendment complaint if recipients share that information with the govern468
ment.
The implications for Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy are obvious. What the government cannot col461. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 53 (1974).
462. See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
241, 248–49 (2007).
463. See id.; Slobogin, supra note 53, at 7.
464. Christopher Williams, Police Use TomTom Data to Target Speed
Traps, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 28, 2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/8480195/Police-use-TomTom-data-to-target-speed-traps.html.
465. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection, in OFFICE OF PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, DEEP PACKET INSPECTION: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS FROM INDUSTRY EXPERTS, available at
http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-privacy-implications-of-deep-packet
-inspection/.
466. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
467. See Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at
the expense of privacy . . . .”).
468. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–43 (1976) (holding that
bank customers cannot raise a Fourth Amendment bar against government
subpoena for bank records documenting their transactions because banks and
their customers are parties to the underlying transactions, and customers
must share information about those transactions with their banks in order for
the banks to perform their roles); cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (“New technology
may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and
many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”) (Alito, J., concurring).
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lect or aggregate directly, it can simply get from third parties
469
with whom the information has been shared. If the government lacks legal authority to install and monitor a GPSenabled tracking device, then it can get the same information
by securing locational data from OnStar, Lojac, a cellular
phone provider, or any number of “apps” that gather and use
locational information as part of their services. This is not an
abstract concern. As of this writing, a case is working its way
through the New York courts involving a subpoena served on
Twitter by the Manhattan District Attorney’s office seeking,
among other things, locational data embedded in a user’s post470
ings. Both Twitter and the user moved to quash the subpoena, but the Supreme Court denied both motions, relying in part
471
on the third-party doctrine.
As discussed in the Introduction, recently leaked documents reveal that every telecommunications company doing
business in the United States has been subject to rolling orders
issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court since at
least 2006 demanding the production of “all call detail records
or ‘telephony metadata’” for every domestic and international
472
telephone call. This metadata, when checked against other
data, enable the discovery of callers’ identities, locations, social
contacts, and group affiliations including the political, reli473
gious, and social, both mainstream and fringe. This is exactly
the sort of detailed personal information that concerned the
474
concurring justices in Jones.
Whether implemented directly or indirectly through private actors, the effects of the surveillance state on projects of
personal development and democratic culture are likely to be
the same. In fact, they might be worse. Much of the hope and
promise of networked technologies is that they expand the horizons of our personal explorations and associations while
providing diverse forums for civil society engagements that
would otherwise be impractical or impossible. That potential
469. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1451.
470. People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
471. Id. at 507; Megan Guess, Twitter Hands over Sealed Occupy Wall
Street Protestor’s Tweets, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 14, 2012), http://arstechnica
.com/tech-policy/2012/09/twitter-hands-over-occupy-wall-street-protesters
-tweets/.
472. FISA, supra note 2, at 2.
473. Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 3.
474. United States v. Jones 132 S. Ct. 945, 963‒64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); Id. at 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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would be severely compromised if we knew the government was
or well might be watching everything we read, write, or do in
475
the digital world. The problem remains if, rather than watching directly, the government could simply accomplish its surveillance through third-party service providers. Of course, we
could avoid being watched by simply withdrawing from these
worlds; but, as one of us has argued elsewhere, this is a Hobson’s choice, at least insofar as liberty and democratic participation are valuable and constitutionally protected social
476
goods.
Among the strengths of our technology-centered approach
is that it can guard against these concerns without needing to
effect dramatic changes to the third-party doctrine. To see why,
it is necessary to say a bit more about the doctrine’s conceptual
structure. Although it overstates matters a bit to suggest that
the third-party doctrine relies on “the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectations of privacy in information
477
voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” there is no doubt that
the third-party doctrine has the same basic conceptual foundation as the public observation doctrine. Although the universe
of persons with whom we share information about our movements in public is, at least in theory, larger than the universe
of people with whom we share, say, information about our financial transactions, in both cases the act of sharing affects our
reasonable expectations of privacy. As we have argued at
length in this Article, however, surveillance technology may
raise Fourth Amendment issues independent of our expectations of privacy in the discrete bits of information gathered by
that technology. The result would not be any different just because the information is shared with a small group of people
rather than the public at large. In either case, Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy will be implicated if the
technology used to gather the information raises the specter of
a surveillance state by facilitating programs of broad, indiscriminate surveillance.

475. Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total
Surveillance’s Privacy Harms: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1934 (2013).
476. Danielle Keats Citron, Hate 3.0: A Civil Rights Agenda to Combat
Online Harassment (forthcoming 2014) (on file with autor); Danielle Keats
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 105 (2009).
477. Jones, S. Ct. at 957; see also Crocker, supra note 204 (arguing for a
modification of the third-party doctrine).
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Let us return to the example of DAS. The System’s core
function is to aggregate data from diverse sources, including
traffic cameras, toll cameras, surveillance cameras, cell phone
providers, GPS-based services, credit card companies, banks,
and internet service providers. Although most of the data coming into DAS when considered discretely would not implicate
reasonable expectations of privacy under either the third-party
doctrine or the public observation doctrine, DAS nevertheless
epitomizes the surveillance state because its very function is to
facilitate a program of broad and indiscriminate surveillance.
Its deployment and use should therefore be subject to Fourth
Amendment regulation.
The result should not be different if the aggregator is a
private entity acting as a state-agent rather than the government itself. Take as an example the data broker Acxiom, which
uses proprietary technology to collect and mine a mind-boggling
array of data about people from various public and third-party
sources, including social network activity, property records,
public-health data, criminal justice sources, car rentals, credit
reports, postal and shipping records, utility bills, gaming, insurance claims, divorce records, browsing habits compiled by
behavioral advertisers, and purchasing histories gathered us478
ing vendor discount cards, among other sources.
Chris
Hoofnagle has dubbed data brokers like Acxiom as “Big Brother’s Little Helpers” because government and law enforcement
479
are among their most important clients. With this level of
government engagement, there is little doubt that Acxiom and
its kin are state agents, at least when conducting business for
480
or on behalf of the government.
Thus, Acxiom’s activities
should be subject to Fourth Amendment review when it is acting as an arm of the government.
None of this requires abandoning or modifying the thirdparty doctrine. It remains true that we have no Fourth
478. See Danielle Citron, Big Data Brokers as Fiduciaries, CONCURRING
OPS. (June 19, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/
2012/06/big-data-brokers-as-fiduciaries.html.
479. Hoofnagle, supra note 24, at 595.
480. So too are the many telephone and electronic communication companies that provide government agencies with user information so frequently
that they have standing price lists describing what they charge to deploy their
search and aggregation technologies for government purposes. See Andy
Greenberg, These are the Prices AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint Charge for Cellphone Wiretaps, FORBES, Apr. 3, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2012/04/03/these-are-the-prices-att-verizon-and-sprint-charge
-for-cellphone-wiretaps/.
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Amendment complaint if a third party with whom we share information gathers that information in traditional ways and
passes it along to the government. There is also no Fourth
Amendment issue just because investigators collect a detailed
mosaic of personal information on a suspect. Rather, it is the
means that matter. Thus, the Fourth Amendment would not be
implicated if a third party used pen registers or similar technology to gather evidence for the government because these
technologies are too limited to facilitate the sort of broad and
indiscriminate surveillance characteristic of a surveillance
481
state.
By contrast, the data aggregation technologies deployed by Verizon and other telecommunications companies to
provide the FBI and the NSA with “telephony metadata” for all
calls “between the United States and abroad” and all calls
“wholly within the United States, including local telephone
482
483
calls” implicate “different constitutional principles.” By virtue of their scale and scope, these data aggregation capacities
epitomize a surveillance state when put at the service of gov484
ernment. Verizon’s use of these technologies at the behest
government agencies should therefore be subject to Fourth
Amendment regulation.

481. This is not to suggest that these more limited technologies do not raise
serious privacy issues. Rather, the point is that those privacy interests must
be addressed by the political branches through legislation or executive order
rather than by the Fourth Amendment. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption
and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 905, 931–39 (2008) (discussing state privacy legislation); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 87, at 202–08 (discussing various legislative regimes regulating government access to third-party records
that were passed in response to the Supreme Court’s refusal to find the Fourth
Amendment applicable). Congress did of course step in to limit the use of pen
registers. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2012). Although critics can certainly argue
that the political branches’ records are hardly perfect on these scores, we prefer constitutional humility and doctrinal parsimony to Fourth Amendment
overreach.
482. FISA, supra note 2, at 2.
483. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).
484. As Jameel Jaffer put the point:
From a civil liberties perspective, the program could hardly be any
more alarming. It’s a program in which some untold number of innocent people have been put under the constant surveillance of government agents. It is beyond Orwellian, and it provides further evidence
of the extent to which basic democratic rights are being surrendered
in secret to the demands of unaccountable intelligence agencies.
Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 3.
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CONCLUSION
Recognizing a constitutional interest in quantitative privacy buttresses Fourth Amendment defenses against a surveillance state. Until now, practical limitations inherent to many
investigative techniques, cultural constraints on mutual surveillance, and existing Fourth Amendment doctrines have provided a virtual guarantee that traditional investigative techniques would not produce the kind of broad and indiscriminate
monitoring that raises the specter of a surveillance state. There
simply are not enough police officers to follow all of us all of the
time. As a society, we have stalwartly resisted the temptations
of mutual surveillance that sustained many totalitarian states.
Fourth Amendment doctrine has also preserved an archipelago
of safe spaces and activities beyond the gaze of government
agents. As a consequence, we have until now sustained a fairly
stable balance between government power and private citizenship that allows us to pursue projects of self-development free
485
from fear that the government is watching.
Recent technological developments, such as the NSA’s
broad and indiscriminate data collection, aggregation, and retention programs, New York’s Domain Awareness System, aerial drones, and GPS-enabled tracking devices threaten to alter
this balance. By their nature, these technologies make possible
the monitoring of everyone all the time. As consequence, granting the government unfettered access to these technologies
opens the door to a surveillance state and the tyranny it entails. It is therefore at the point of unfettered access to those
technologies that the Fourth Amendment should intervene. As
we have argued here, this technology-centered approach to
quantitative privacy holds great promise in our continuing efforts to strike a reasonable balance between the competing interests of law enforcement and citizen privacy while preserving
the critical service of the Fourth Amendment as a bulwark
against the rise of a surveillance state.

485. See generally Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011).

